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4 The Panhellenic Socialist Movement and European Integration: The Primacy 
of the Leader 
 
 
Dionyssis G. Dimitrakopoulos and Argyris G. Passas 
 
 
Introduction1 
 
This chapter focuses on the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) and seeks to 
trace the origin and the content of its preferences on European integration since its 
establishment in 1974.  It challenges the established view that – couched as it is in 
PASOK’s rhetoric in the immediate post-1974 era – construes PASOK as an initially 
instinctively anti-European political party that subsequently performed a policy U-
turn, a true political transformation by turning from a vocal anti-EEC stance to a pro-
European (even federalist) attitude (Tsardanidis 1998, 295, 299, 300; Kazakos 1994, 
5; Verney 1987, 259-60, 263; Featherstone 1988, 178; Couloumbis 1993, 126; 
Featherstone 1994, 158-9).  It also takes issue with more nuanced accounts that refer 
to a ‘subtle metamorphosis’ of PASOK’s stance since 1977 resulting from the 
exigencies of PASOK’s political competition strategy – as well as shifts in public 
opinion and a ‘pragmatic adjustment’ to the requirements of governing Greece 
(Verney 1994, 347-9; Loulis 1984, 379; Coufoudakis 1987, 238-40).  The chapter 
advances four claims.   
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First, PASOK did not perform a U-turn because it did not have a clearly elaborated 
and explicitly articulated policy on European integration from which to depart.  This 
is demonstrated not by the absence of a rhetorically robust thesis, since the ‘ΕΟΚ και 
ΝΑΤΟ το ίδιο συνδικάτο’2 slogan and opposition to accession to the European 
Communities were unequivocal, but by the absence of a clear definition of the kind of 
Europe that it stood for in the second half of the 1970s3.  In the absence of a response 
to this question, it is impossible to refer to a ‘U-turn’.  Second, electoral, economic 
and geo-strategic interests, ideas (populism, initially, modernisation along social 
democratic lines in the second half of the 1990s) and, more importantly, institutions 
(specifically, the autonomy of the leader vis-à-vis the party organisation and 
membership) played a major role in the gradual definition of PASOK’s views on 
European integration.  The interplay of these factors and their outcome are time 
sensitive.  Although it is exemplified by specific events (such as the decision to 
support the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and the determined pursuit of 
accession to the third stage of EMU) it ought to be construed as a process.  Third, the 
gradual elaboration and determined pursuit of advanced preferences regarding the 
future of Europe – couched in the social democratic tradition as well as practical 
considerations - was the hallmark of the Simitis era (1996-2004); it is only during this 
time that PASOK (then the ruling party) had a clear objective regarding the future of 
Europe as well as a clear strategy regarding the country’s involvement therein.  
Finally, although this marked the high point in the history of the party’s policy on 
European integration, their adoption and pursuit have been ephemeral since they do 
not appear to enjoy the support of powerful ‘carriers’ or a majority within the party; in 
that sense, the Simitis era can be likened to a Europeanist ‘intermezzo’.  Indeed, as 
will be demonstrated in this chapter, under George A. Papandreou, PASOK appears to 
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have abandoned the left-wing federalist Europeanism doggedly pursued under the 
leadership of Costas Simitis.   
 
The discussion of the content and the origins of PASOK’s rhetoric and practice 
regarding European integration since 1974 can be divided into four phases: 1974-
1984; 1985-1995; 1996-2004 and 2004-to date.   
 
 
Rhetoric and tactics as substitutes for policy 
 
The origins of radical rhetoric 
Since its establishment in September 1974 PASOK has had to reconcile competing 
and often contradictory demands.  This is so despite its initially narrow electoral 
basis4 and Andreas Papandreou’s decision to break with Enossi Kentrou (EK), the 
dominant but factious party of the Centre-Left of the pre-1967 period.  During this 
period and especially the crucial years that preceded its accession to power, the 
remarkable diversity of PASOK’s leadership, cadres, and voters was a key source of 
the multiple messages that emanated from it both with regards to European integration 
and other issues.  Indeed, three groups can be identified at the point of PASOK’s 
establishment, namely the ‘leftists’, the ‘technocrats’ and, finally, the ‘conformists’ 
(i.e. centrists) who stemmed from EK – the Declaration of 3 September 1974, the 
party’s founding document, reflects an attempt to reconcile their demands 
(Spourdalakis 1998, 21-2)5.   
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The first group brought together mainly young activists who had participated in the 
anti-junta struggle at home and abroad, relied on a Marxist understanding of 
contemporary Greek politics and society coupled with nationalist overtones as well as 
influences stemming from dependence theory.  Their rhetoric enabled PASOK to 
gradually attract voters from older generations (especially those who had been 
defeated in the civil war of the late 1940s) who had hitherto supported other parties of 
the Left, especially the Communist Party.  The second group was composed mainly of 
well-educated supporters of the Centre-Left many of whom had become politically 
active (on the basis of a modernisation agenda) during the turbulent years that 
preceded the advent of the dictatorial regime in 1967.  The final group brought 
together mainly MPs and aspiring politicians many of whom had close personal ties 
with Andreas Papandreou and his father, the last leader of EK, and brought with them 
an unparalleled understanding of grassroots politics.  Many of the leftists and the 
‘conformists’ were steeped into populism.  Nationalism was an additional hallmark of 
their worldview and rhetoric.  Nationalism, anti-Americanism and wider anti-Western 
attitudes, largely stemmed from the country’s recent history.  They were couched not 
only in the American support for the military junta but also a sense of humiliation 
after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in the summer of 1974.  As a result, PASOK’s 
formative statements reflected the prevalent feeling of anti-Americanism that 
dominated Greek politics in the aftermath of the fall of the dictatorial regime.  This 
often provided fertile ground for the leftists who attacked the EEC as a sidekick of the 
USA that was dominated by large member states.  They construed the EEC as part of 
the West whose interests conflicted with those of the nation.   
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Much of PASOK’s early rhetoric on European integration and other issues reflected 
this understanding.  This contributed to PASOK being seen as little more than a 
protest movement.  However, much of that rhetoric also mirrored real political and 
socio-economic issues that the country faced.  Though Andreas Papandreou’s 
charisma enabled him to become the focal point for the aforementioned diverse 
groups,6 in reality it was his decision to couch PASOK’s establishment in three 
common and fundamental issues that brought these groups together.  These issues 
concerned (i) Greece’s place in the world, (ii) the make-up and the actual operation of 
the country’s democratic institutions and (iii) significant social inequalities.   
PASOK’s early slogans such as ‘Η Ελλάδα ανήκει στους Έλληνες’7 and the demands 
for social justice (captured in the constant references to PASOK as the party of the 
‘non-privileged Greeks’) reflected both profound economic and social inequalities 
that had dogged the country at least since the end of the civil war in the late 1940s, 
and a prevalent sense of the need to emancipate the country from ties that had often 
served its allies but not its own interests (Coufoudakis 1987, 232).  At the same time, 
the nationalist rhetoric enabled PASOK to distance itself from both of its main 
political rivals.  Nea Dimokratia (ND), established in 1974 and led by Konstantinos 
Karamanlis, was the dominant party of the Centre-Right whose unequivocal pro-
Western orientation was exemplified by its leader’s statement that ‘ανήκοµεν εις τη 
Δύση’8.  PASOK also sought to distance itself from (without challenging) the 
Communist Party whilst wooing its electorate9.  Although it rejected the Soviet 
model, much of its rhetoric reflected both the concerns and the terminology of 
Communist Party voters.  The nationalist overtones of PASOK’s anti-Western 
rhetoric reflected the nascent political movement’s the need to carve out its own space 
(and message) in the rapidly changing Greek political landscape of the mid- to late-
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1970s but it also mirrored a powerful demand for the confident re-assertion of the 
nation’s independence.   
 
At the same time, significant social inequalities reflected both the country’s under-
developed economy and the results of more than two decades of bitter internal 
political strife that followed the end of the civil war.  The latter created and 
perpetuated a profound feeling of exclusion or even oppression10 inflicted on those 
who were (or were thought to be) on the ‘wrong side’ of the political centre ground 
while the former had led not only to large and successive waves of emigration 
(predominantly to the West) during the 1950s and 1960s but also the perpetuation of 
major economic problems including the dominant role of family enterprises of a 
primitive character (especially in agriculture and tourism), an overgrown service 
sector, an ineffective civil service that was based on (and the victim of) patronage, 
and an uncompetitive industrial sector that relied on protection from foreign imports 
and was mainly geared towards internal demand (Tsoukalas 1969, chap. 9).  These 
economic structures largely reflected a quasi-institutionalised emphasis of public 
policies on short-term gains irrespective of medium- and long-term consequences as 
well as the short term logic and speculative character of Greek capitalists who were 
more interested in maximising income from public subsidies than in modernising their 
business practices (Tsakalotos 2001, 142).   
 
Finally, the domestic political landscape of the mid-1970s was also marked by the 
compelling popular demand for the real democratisation of the Greek polity.  This 
was the logical consequence of decades of bitter internal political strife in which the 
royal family, segments of the armed and security forces and powerful families often 
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conspired with their foreign allies and acted against the wishes of the people.  Thus, 
the inclusion of the objective of veritable popular sovereignty and substantive 
democratisation in PASOK’s founding declaration of September 1974 came as no 
surprise.   
 
Against this background, it is hard to see why a newly-established political party 
should have sought to develop a set of fully-fledged proposals or objectives regarding 
the future of the then stagnating EC that, at that point in time, had little to offer in 
terms of direct assistance to an under-developed economy.  Nevertheless, Prime 
Minister Karamanlis’ historic decision to seek Greece’s quick accession to the EC 
provided a major impetus for a fierce political debate on the issue of membership; it is 
in that context that PASOK’s robust rhetorical statements became the substitute of a 
coherent policy.  This debate was marked by PASOK’s sustained rejection (until the 
general election of 1977) of the notion of membership.  This marked a radical change 
from the consensus between the two main parties of the Centre-Left and the Right that 
(unlike the Left) supported the Association agreement (including the prospect of 
membership) in the early 1960s (Pateras 1984, chap. 1; Verney 1987, 256).  Two 
important caveats ought to be added here.   
 
First, although Karamanlis’ decision to re-launch11 Greece’s accession bid was 
explicitly couched in political considerations (especially the need to strengthen 
democracy, secure the nation’s territorial integrity against its aggressive eastern 
neighbour and reduce the country’s dependence on the USA) PASOK’s criticism was 
couched in primarily economic grounds though political considerations were present 
too12.  This pronounced emphasis on the economic aspects of membership (and 
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European integration as a whole) has remained a central feature of PASOK’s stance 
ever since13.  Second, the debate regarding accession to the EC became a key political 
battleground for PASOK.  The public debate attracted attention and Andreas 
Papandreou used it skilfully as a platform for the presentation of simplistic, at times 
ill-defined and often contradictory views whose main strength lied in their capacity to 
echo (and often amplify) fears, a wider defensive attitude as well as legitimate 
concerns regarding the country’s economy.   
 
These contradictions are extremely revealing.  Papandreou made masterful use of 
leftist political rhetoric essentially in an effort to turn PASOK from a protest 
movement and an élite party14 to a broad political alliance (of often competing 
interests and views) and, subsequently, a mass party whose vocation was to govern 
the country.  This is unsurprising since the issue of membership of the EC combined 
two major strands of his thinking, namely the Harvard-educated and former Berkeley 
Economics Professor’s pre-occupation with issues of economic development and the 
political leader’s interest in broader geo-political issues such as the Cold War and the 
North-South divide.  Three factors account for PASOK’s initial formal rejection of the 
principle of membership.   
 
First, given that the Left had opposed the Association agreement15 and the principle of 
membership after 1974, a party such as PASOK that aspired to become the main anti-
Right actor in Greek politics could not afford to be seen to support one of the core 
choices of the conservative ND.  Rather, the issue of membership of the EC was an 
excellent opportunity for the nascent party to shape and reflect the (often assumed) 
wishes of the electorate that it aspired to represent.  Second, given PASOK’s analysis 
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of the country’s economic problems and its position in the world, support for 
membership (which carries both opportunities and duties) could have blurred the 
simple message that its leader wanted it to carry.  Indeed, PASOK’s formal analysis 
drew not only on Marxism but also on dependence theory (especially the work of 
André Gunder Frank and Samir Amin) and saw the country as part not only of Europe 
but also of the Balkans and the Mediterranean, i.e. the periphery whose interests 
differed from those of the imperialist centre.  As a result, the exigencies of its 
economic development and political emancipation could not be reconciled with 
membership of a Western organisation that was (i) composed of prosperous capitalist 
states and (ii) lacking the means to engage in market intervention that was one of 
PASOK’s explicitly chosen means to promote economic development.  PASOK 
expressed the fear that since the EC was the junior partner of the USA, it ‘would trade 
full membership of the EC for concessions on Cyprus and the Aegean which would 
satisfy the Americans’ (Verney 1987, 259).  Third, in addition to these considerations, 
one key institutional factor helped shape PASOK’s initial declarations on the principle 
of membership, namely the predominant role of its leader in intra-party politics.  
Although PASOK’s establishment had been followed by an unprecedented political 
dialogue at the grassroots level, most of the party’s pronouncements on major issues 
reflected its leader’s tactical and strategic choices.  This was the result of his 
hegemonic position within the party that, nevertheless, could not conceal the often 
uneasy co-existence of activists and members of the leadership whose views differed 
remarkably.  Indeed, at least until 1977, the party had not debated the issue of 
membership of the EC (interviews with former PASOK Cabinet ministers).  Rather, 
Andreas Papandreou’s pronouncements were treated as the party’s policy (Verney 
1994, 298).   
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The party could not aspire to capture power without expressing the wishes of a large 
(and diverse) part of the electorate.  Papandreou’s public pronouncements on the 
principle of membership reflected this need even from an early stage.  For example, 
on the occasion of the then French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing’s visit in 1975, 
Exormisi, the party’s newspaper, denounced Karamanlis’ pursuit of membership as a 
‘sell-out’ and a threat to national sovereignty, but Papandreou stated that - although 
PASOK was an opposition party, it supported Karamanlis’ policy on France and the 
EC (Spourdalakis 1998, 41 fn. 33).  In addition, during the early 1960s Papandreou 
had publicly supported16 the Association agreement largely on the basis of the fact 
that it could facilitate the country’s economic modernisation.  Such contradictory 
statements reflected Papandreou’s efforts to build a volkspartei capable of reflecting 
the wishes of large segments of public opinion17.   
 
Preparing for government 
The general election of 1977 marked a turning point in PASOK’s handling of the 
issue of membership of the EC.  PASOK became the main opposition party by nearly 
doubling its share of the vote (to 25 per cent that corresponded to almost one third of 
the seats in Parliament).  Papandreou’s astute (and audacious) political calculation of 
1974 was beginning to pay dividends.  By choosing to create a new political party in 
1974 instead of leading EK, he broke not with EK’s traditional electorate but with that 
party’s ageing leadership.  His objective was to attract EK’s rather heterogeneous 
electorate without being associated with that party’s leadership.  Indeed, EK was the 
main source of PASOK’s new voters in the 1977 election.  Despite Papandreou’s 
disappointment, other senior PASOK officials interpreted this result as an indication 
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that the electorate was beginning to see it as a party of governmental vocation 
(interview with former PASOK Cabinet minister).  The newly-established party had 
already made significant progress towards becoming part of the mainstream of Greek 
politics but it still fell short of having the support of the majority of voters.  Rhetorical 
devices would not enable it to overcome this barrier.  Rather, the party had to have a 
programme and be seen to be mature enough to govern the country.   
 
While Karamanlis was actively pursuing the objective of membership, Papandreou’s 
task was equally Herculean.  He had to (i) steer the party towards a realistic 
programme and (ii) attract even more centrist voters.  These combined needs provided 
a major impetus for the gradual disengagement both from the previous extreme 
statements rejecting the prospect of membership of the EC and the notion that, since 
PASOK was in opposition, its leader could say in public whatever he wanted.  Indeed, 
Papandreou was, at the time, taking the prospect of membership much more seriously 
(and realistically) than his earlier public statements would suggest (interview).  There 
are two major indications of this fact.  First, when he appointed a committee (chaired 
by economics Professor Apostolos Lazaris) to draft (in 1977) PASOK’s programme 
on the basis of which he was planning to fight the 1981 general election, he appointed 
Grigoris Varfis (a former senior civil servant in the Ministry of National Economy 
who was not a party member) to ensure that PASOK’s commitments would be 
compatible with obligations deriving from membership of the EC (interview).  Varfis, 
an economist, had unsurpassed inside knowledge of these negotiations because he had 
been a senior member of the Greek negotiating team from which he resigned in 
January 1977 as a result of his disagreement with Prime Minister Karamanlis’ efforts 
to achieve membership without paying particular attention to its terms18.  Second, 
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although he was aware of the public’s preference for a clear (i.e. ‘yes’ or ‘no’) answer 
to the question of membership, Papandreou began to gradually move away from 
explicit references to withdrawal from the EC.  Instead, he made increasing references 
to ‘a special agreement’19 and, closer to the 1981 general election, the re-negotiation 
of the terms of membership and a referendum.  Indeed, the party’s 1981 electoral 
manifesto did not refer to withdrawal but to the re-negotiation of the terms of 
membership (interview with former PASOK Cabinet minister).   
 
The claims regarding re-negotiation reflected an effort to portray PASOK as a party 
that was capable of promoting the national interest (unlike the Right which was 
allegedly pursuing a ‘sell-out’).  The promise of a referendum mirrored PASOK’s 
claim to protect ‘popular sovereignty’ whilst it also drawing on the Labour 
government’s experience and the British referendum of June 1975.  The references to 
a ‘special agreement’ are more revealing in the sense that they support one of the key 
claims made in this chapter: PASOK did not have a clear view of the kind of Europe 
that it preferred in the late 1970s; rather, it was much more aware of (and vocal about) 
what it opposed.  As a result, it was drawing selectively both on its own fuzzy 
ideology and events that were taking place primarily in the Greek but also (though to 
a lesser extent) the broader international environment.  In that respect, Norway’s 
arrangement with the EC was used to lend credence to PASOK’s claim regarding the 
‘special agreement’ that it appeared to prefer over membership.  Two compelling 
questions remained unanswered.   
 
First, what would be the precise content of this special arrangement?  Again, 
PASOK’s rhetoric was much more explicit about what it sought to avoid - namely 
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restrictions on macro-economic policy and surrendering controls over the movement 
of capital and goods, than what it sought to promote.  Second, how far (if at all) could 
a country such as Greece rely on the example of Norway, i.e. a prosperous country 
whose geo-political position differed markedly from that of Greece?  More 
importantly, if the EC was – as PASOK’s analysis claimed – dominated by the large 
member states, how would a small non-member (with the characteristics of Greece) 
influence decision making therein?  If the claim regarding the Norwegian example 
was meant to show that there was an alternative to full membership, the claim 
regarding the referendum was part of a subtle but important strategic change whose 
aim was to shift the emphasis of PASOK’s attacks from the EC to the government’s 
handling of the negotiations (Verney 1994, 352).   
 
The impact of the domestic political environment was becoming increasingly clear.  
While this process of change was taking place at the level of the national political 
landscape, disagreements within the party – exacerbated by the prospect of 
membership of the EC and the decisive election of 1981 – were beginning to surface.  
One important incident was indicative of the party’s uneasy internal balance of power.  
Costas Simitis – a social democrat, academic and active member of the anti-junta 
resistance movement, resigned on 13 June 1979 on the occasion of the party’s 
decision to withdraw a poster that, echoing Euro-communist views, indicated a more 
nuanced view on European integration: ‘Όχι στην Ευρώπη των µονοπωλίων – Ναι 
στην Ευρώπη των λαών’ it read20 (Simitis 2005, 25).  Although Papandreou’s 
decision was partly motivated by his wish to limit the party political prospects of one 
of the party’s most knowledgeable and respected senior cadres and was also proof of 
the uneasy co-existence of leftists, centrists and social democrats.  This incident also 
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demonstrated the clear limits of Papandreou’s strategy of papering over the party’s 
internal ideological (and broader political) divisions.  That this incident took place in 
June 1979 is not a coincidence.  The accession agreement had been signed in Athens 
just a month earlier and the Parliament was about to debate its ratification.  Although 
this meant that Papandreou had an excellent opportunity to prepare and present the 
party’s own vision for the future of Europe and the country’s role therein, he made a 
decision that was illustrative of his own tactical nous as well as his party’s inability to 
provide a credible answer to a major political and economic issue: after making a 
brief statement, he chose to lead his party’s MPs out of the chamber just as the debate 
was about to begin.  The decision was made by the party’s Executive Bureau in an 
emergency session literally minutes before the beginning of the parliamentary session.  
As a result, only two senior MPs (the centrists Alevras and Haralambopoulos) were 
aware of his decision prior to the commencement of the debate in Parliament (Verney 
1994, 354).  The terminology that Papandreou used in his brief statement was 
indicative of his decision to maximise the political damage inflicted on the 
government (which, in turn, was expected to portray accession as a major success of 
its foreign policy) and steal the thunder from the Communist Party whose MPs had 
also decided to avoid the debate.  He denounced the decision of the government (and 
the European Commission) to withhold the ‘minutes’ of the negotiations for only they 
would enable Parliament to know what concessions the government had made.  He 
argued that this was an indication of the government’s ‘subservience’ to foreign 
powers and claimed that membership would dilute popular sovereignty as a result of 
the supremacy of EC law.  This was, he claimed, a major reason why PASOK rejected 
the principle of membership.  Instead, PASOK refused to legitimise the process that 
the government had chosen and promised to first inform the people ‘comprehensively 
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and objectively’ and then hold a referendum (Hellenic Parliament debate, 25 June 
1979, 5499-500).   
 
The major tactical strength of this decision lay in the idea that the government had 
turned membership into a fait accompli despite PASOK’s protests regarding its 
implications for national sovereignty.  Coupled with the Greeks’ endemic sense of the 
‘underdog’ that politicians often cultivated, and the call for a referendum (that 
required the assent of the President of the Republic, a post that Karamanlis was 
expected to occupy at a later stage) Papandreou’s decision was designed to provide an 
escape route for PASOK by amplifying the notion that membership was now a fact, 
indeed one with which a future PASOK-led government would have to deal.  In other 
words, the issue of membership had been resolved de facto by Karamanlis (interview 
with former PASOK Cabinet minister).  Papandreou’s conviction about this is 
demonstrated by his subsequent public references to the costs of withdrawal and the 
notion that they would perhaps be greater than the cost of membership (Varfis n.d., 1).   
 
In addition to these tactical considerations, Papandreou’s decision also reflected the 
‘ideological agnosticism’ that permeated PASOK since its establishment.  PASOK 
did not have a clearly defined ideological position on the EC; in fact, it is hard to 
pinpoint precisely PASOK’s general ideological position (interview with former 
PASOK Cabinet minister).  The rapid growth in PASOK’s electoral support 
exacerbated the problem of its internal coherence.  The internal divisions became 
more evident when the Committee for Analysis and Programming begun to develop 
PASOK’s programme.  As a leading member of the committee acknowledged, the end 
result was a combination of conservative, socialist, centrist and other viewpoints 
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(interview with former PASOK Cabinet minister).  The closer PASOK moved to 
becoming a catch-all party, in an effort to win the general election, the less adequate 
its référentiel was.  Greece joined the EC in January 1981 and nine months later 
PASOK won a landslide victory in the general election.  Confronted with the reality 
of membership and the exigencies of governing the country, PASOK was compelled 
to move clearly and unequivocally from populist rhetoric to concrete action.   
 
From rhetoric to praxis 
PASOK’s first four years in power were marked by the use of declarations as a 
substitute for action21 on core foreign policy issues (Coufoudakis 1987, 248).  In 
terms of EC policy, PASOK had to find a way out of its electoral pledges.  The issue 
of membership was resolved in a typically incremental manner.  On the one hand, 
Papandreou quickly (and quietly) abandoned the pledge to organise a referendum.  On 
the other hand, the government sought to re-negotiate the terms of the country’s 
membership, thus beginning to deal in a much more pragmatic way with serious (and 
undoubtedly real) economic problems.   
 
Another part of Papandreou’s problem had to do with the political personnel that he 
had at his disposal.  Indeed, he was the only member of the first PASOK Cabinet who 
had ministerial experience and even that dated back from the mid-1960s.  Moreover, 
his government had to face a rather hostile civil service which he intended to reform.  
A former technocrat himself, he appreciated the importance of expertise and 
experience in the management of government business.  This is why he appointed 
Grigoris Varfis as European Affairs Minister in charge of dealing with the entire EC 
portfolio apart from European Political Co-operation (EPC) business that remained 
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the responsibility of Foreign Secretary Yannis Kharalambopoulos (a centrist).  Varfis’ 
main task was not only to manage relations with the EC but, crucially, to prepare a 
memorandum for the future of Greece’s relationship with the EC.  Varfis was 
extremely well-placed to do it not only because he had first hand experience from the 
negotiations for Greece’s accession but also because he had considerable experience 
as a senior official with the Ministry of Co-ordination (then Ministry of National 
Economy, now Finance) and was well aware of the weaknesses of the Greek 
economy.  In addition, Papandreou appointed Costas Simitis (who, at the time, was 
not an MP) to the crucial post of Minister of Agriculture22.  Varfis drafted the 
memorandum with the assistance of a small team of civil servants but without the 
direct input of party officials.  The memorandum, presented to the EC in March 1982, 
is a remarkable text for three reasons.   
 
First, far from echoing the populism of PASOK’s rhetoric of the mid- to late-1970s, it 
provided a dispassionate and balanced account of Greek demands that reflected the 
major problems that the Greek economy was likely to face in the context of the EC as 
well as the unevenness of the accession agreement.  After a concise and frank 
presentation of the structural weaknesses of the Greek economy, the memorandum 
referred clearly not only to the responsibility of the Greek government to ensure the 
modernisation of the economy but also the harmonious development and the 
convergence of the economies of the member states as key objectives of the Treaty of 
Rome.  The Greek government claimed that its efforts to resolve the country’s 
economic problems (that had been exacerbated by the international crisis of the late 
1970s) was not only part of the national interest but was in line with the EC’s repeated 
calls for Community action for the reduction of the discrepancies between regions and 
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states though this action had been hampered by the absence of appropriate 
mechanisms, the inefficiencies of existing mechanisms and the absence of adequate 
funding (Hellenic Government 1982, 7-8).  Highlighting the extremely modest re-
distributive capacity of the EC budget, the Greek government argued that EC 
membership was very likely to exacerbate the country’s economic problems.  
Crucially, it pointed out that the Community’s preferential treatment of the products 
of other Mediterranean member states had not been extended to Greek produce.  In 
addition, although the Common Agricultural Policy covered on average 95 per cent of 
the agricultural products of the nine member states, it covered only 75 per cent of 
Greek produce and did so in a less intensive manner.  Arguing that the fight against 
regional inequalities should be a top priority for the EC, the Greek government 
proposed the introduction of a new set of arrangements - including exemptions for 
reasonable periods of time – and the provision of funding to Greece under EC 
financial mechanisms.  Highlighting the importance of its own five-year economic 
growth plan that the PASOK government was to implement, the Greek government 
also asked for EC support for domestic regional and sectoral policies – especially 
small and medium-sized companies and tourism, and the flexible implementation of 
competition rules in a manner that would take into account the objectives of economic 
growth, the improvement of the population’s living standards, the revision of EC rules 
for the provision of funding in a manner that would take into account the peculiarities 
of the Greek economy, including the small size and the low productivity of farms and 
the high inflation rate.  Though the concluding section referred to the Greek 
government’s belief that these measures were minimal requirements for the 
establishment of a regime that would not go against vital national interests, the 
document did not refer to the prospect of withdrawal from the EC.  When Papandreou 
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presented the draft memorandum to senior party officials, one of them asked for an 
explicit reference to a threat of withdrawal to be included in the text.  Nevertheless, 
Papandreou assured the authors of the memorandum that this would not be necessary 
and that he had already liaised with Karamanlis23 about it (interview).  This was, 
effectively, the end of PASOK’s references to withdrawal from the EC.  Indeed, when 
a foreign journalist asked Papandreou whether the rejection of the Greek 
memorandum would lead to the country’s withdrawal from the EC, Papandreou stated 
that he had won an election, rather than organise a revolution (Varfis n.d., 1).   
 
Second, unlike most of the public statements of PASOK officials and MPs who 
criticised the EC, the memorandum also made positive (though certainly limited) 
proposals for EC-wide changes, including the enhancement and the improved co-
ordination of structural funds, a theme that the EC would subsequently deal with in 
the 1986 and the 1990-1 intergovernmental conferences (IGCs).   
 
Finally, although the memorandum was consistent with PASOK’s pre-electoral 
emphasis on the economic aspects of membership, the absence of any reference to 
political integration was striking.  A left-wing government of a small member state 
that was facing clear security threats could, perhaps, be expected to at least raise the 
issue of solidarity.  The absence of such references is indicative of a deeply-embedded 
(though gradually weakening) sense of political distrust vis-à-vis Western Europe.  
This was exemplified by the Greek Presidency’s24 decision to veto (under EPC 
procedures) a statement condemning the destruction by the Soviet Union’s air force of 
a Korean civilian airliner in 1983.  This led some MEPs to condemn Greek foreign 
policy as ‘a blow to the whole idea of political co-operation’, claiming that Greek 
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foreign policy was ‘more aligned with Moscow’s than with those of (its) European 
friends’ (cited in Financial Times, 16 September 1983, 2).  Moreover, when the 
European Parliament voted on the 1984 Draft Treaty on European Union PASOK 
MEPs chose to abstain.   
 
The economic demands contained in the memorandum had two direct implications.  
First, the Commission agreed that, although the Greek government’s five-year 
economic plan ought to be consistent with EC commitments,  
(a) special provision would be made for financial assistance on infrastructure 
projects, employment and social policy measures, agriculture, transport and 
the environment to the tune of more than £450m;  
(b) more substantial aid amounting to nearly £1.6bn under the Integrated 
Mediterranean Programmes with Greece being the second largest beneficiary 
from this £3.97bn package which would also cover parts of Italy and France;25  
(c) £740m would be allocated to Greek agriculture between 1985 and 1991, £72m 
to forestry, £84m to fishing and £630m to ‘general economic development’ in 
addition to  
(d) efforts to improve Greece’s ‘take up’ of EEC funds despite (or, rather, because 
of) the deficiencies of the Athenian bureaucracy (Financial Times, 6 May 
1983, 2).   
Second, this outcome allowed Papandreou to claim that his strategy had been 
vindicated and that his government had honoured the pledge to re-negotiate (and 
improve) the terms of Greek membership of the EC.  In hindsight, one can therefore 
claim that instead of preparing the country’s withdrawal, Papandreou’s anti-EC 
rhetoric was meant to prepare the EC for the re-negotiation of the terms of Greek 
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membership whilst serving the crucial tactical task of turning PASOK into the main 
vehicle for the expression of the anti-Right political forces in post-junta Greece.   
 
 
From rhetoric to reality 
 
Between populism and modernisation 
PASOK remained in power during the second half of the 1980s.  In the absence of any 
serious debate within the party, government action became the means by which 
PASOK identified and pursued its preferences on European integration.  It is in that 
context that spectacular contradictions between various aspects of its action became 
evident.  Government action highlighted the serious (if not irreconcilable) tensions not 
only between the government’s European and domestic policies, but also (if not more 
importantly) various aspects of PASOK’s domestic policies.  The most important 
novel characteristic of PASOK’s action was the de facto recognition on the part of the 
government that membership of the EC offered the country constraints as well as 
opportunities26.  This subtle but significant change was facilitated by the experience 
acquired after four years of membership (during which PASOK was in government) 
but also by the gradual emergence of a group of senior officials who took centre stage 
in the government.  Costas Simitis, who became the Minister of National Economy 
after PASOK’s electoral victory in 1985, and Theodoros Pangalos who occupied the 
post of Alternate Foreign Minister in charge of European affairs, are two individuals 
who stand out.  Both were social democrats, convinced pro-Europeans and had 
acquired considerable experience in European affairs since 198127.   
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As regards the government’s action at the European level, three major developments 
forced it to adopt a more active stance in the mid-1980s, namely the prospect of the 
accession of Spain and Portugal, the likely re-launch of the single market project and 
the first revision of the Treaty of Rome.  The Greek government linked these three 
issues in an effort to promote the enhancement of the EC’s re-distributive capacity 
from which Greece stood to gain.  Arguably, this reflected more the country’s needs 
than the party’s social democratic views.  Since the accession of Spain and Portugal 
was certain to increase competition for Greek agricultural products, the Greek 
government repeatedly threatened to veto the Iberian enlargement if Greek economic 
interests were not taken into account.  At the same time, it tried (unsuccessfully) to 
block the decision to convene the IGC that eventually led to the Single European Act 
of 198628.  Tactical considerations account for Papandreou’s stance.  First, speaking in 
the European Parliament two years earlier he had made an explicit plea in favour of 
the reform of the EC’s institutional framework; indeed, he called for a ‘new Messina 
conference’ that would enable the EC to deal with new problems without distancing 
itself from the spirit of the Treaty of Rome.  Second, Theodoros Pangalos argued that, 
although the reform of the EC was a necessity, it could be achieved without an IGC 
(Kazakos 1987, 436-7).   
 
Though the party had not been involved in the formulation of the proposals submitted 
by the Greek government to the IGC, their content echoed the defensive attitude vis-à-
vis the EC that had taken root within the party and the government.  The process that 
led to the Dooge report (which was meant to prepare the IGC) demonstrated the 
disparity29 between the Greek views and those of other governments (Kazakos 1987, 
436).  A major characteristic of the Greek proposals was the vociferous support for 
Published in Social Democracy and European Integration: The Politics of Preference Formation, 
edited by D. G. Dimitrakopoulos, 117-156. London/New York: Routledge, 2010. 
- 225 - 
intergovernmental institutions and a cautious (or even hostile) attitude vis-à-vis 
supranational institutions.  For example, Greece opposed both the involvement of the 
European Parliament in the appointment of the Commission and the proposal to give 
it veto power over future enlargements and association agreements (Ioakimidis 1996, 
15-16).   
 
Despite its initial objections, the Greek government agreed to the SEA and presented 
it to the Greek Parliament as an agreement that favoured Greek interests (Hellenic 
Parliament debate, 14 January 1987, 2616).  The terminology used by some majority 
MPs in Parliament reflected the defensive attitude of the party vis-à-vis the integration 
process.  For example, the inclusion of provisions regarding foreign and security 
policy in the Single European Act was presented very timidly, the emphasis being on 
consensus as a key procedural requirement that ensured that decisions could not go 
against Greek interests.  Moreover, majority MPs were quick to point out the fact that 
the Luxembourg compromise had been preserved (Hellenic Parliament debate, 14 
January 1987, 2615).  Nevertheless, the speech made by the then Alternate Foreign 
Minister in charge of European affairs indicated that a robustly pro-European and 
decidedly social democratic discourse was now a central feature of PASOK’s stance 
on Europe.  Two aspects of his speech stand out.  First, Pangalos did not confine his 
speech to the merits of the SEA.  Rather, he presented passionately a social 
democratic platform for a united Europe that would entail a ‘unified political entity’ 
capable of and willing to determine the future of European peoples independently of 
the other major powers, promoting peace and prosperity (Hellenic Parliament debate, 
14 January 1987, 2623-7).  He also highlighted the importance of economic and social 
cohesion as a key (constitutional) objective of the EC and the future predominance of 
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the political over the economic aspect of integration.  The second major novelty of his 
speech concerned the new conceptualisation of Greece’s relationship with the EC: 
Pangalos castigated both the conception of the EC as a vincolo esterno and the notion 
that the EC is nothing but a ‘cash cow’.  Rather, membership offered a framework and 
a mechanism that could promote both the modernisation of the Greek economy and 
the long-standing objective of the Greek Centre-Left and the Left to emancipate the 
country from the influence of the USA.  This required the self-confident involvement 
in EC procedures, coalition-building and a move away from the perception of the EC 
as a mere transaction forum.   
 
The combination of the re-launch of the single market project with the elevation of 
economic and social cohesion to the level of the EC’s ‘constitutional’ objectives 
(coupled with the explicit political commitment to increase the flow of funds to less-
developed regions) account for the Greek government’s positive stance.  While the 
trade-off between economic liberalisation (and re-regulation) on the one hand and the 
significant enhancement of the EC’s re-distributive capacity on the other was clear at 
the European level, and it accounts for the Greek government’s decision to sign the 
SEA, this decision did not signal the adoption of a new economic policy paradigm at 
the domestic level, nor did it entail a new kind of relationship with the EC.  This is so 
because PASOK’s statism had roots that were as deep as those of populism.   
 
Indeed, the Greek government was pursuing contradictory domestic policies.  The 
significant increases in public spending that marked domestic economic policy during 
the first four years of socialist rule had been funded primarily by means of public 
borrowing.  Papandreou was aware of the problem of public debt and sought to 
Published in Social Democracy and European Integration: The Politics of Preference Formation, 
edited by D. G. Dimitrakopoulos, 117-156. London/New York: Routledge, 2010. 
- 227 - 
change economic policy by appointing Simitis to the Ministry of National Economy 
to stabilise the finances of a country that faced a severe current account crisis30.  A 
key part of this effort was a loan from the EC31 which, crucially, was presented to the 
public as the real reason for the domestic stabilisation programme32 (interview with 
former PASOK Cabinet minister).  This was an indication of both the defensive 
attitude of the government vis-à-vis the EC and its propensity to give in to the strong 
populist strand that permeated the party.  Instead of presenting the loan (and the EC as 
a whole) as a key mechanism for the modernisation of the economy, the easy route of 
the ‘politics of fear’ was chosen, couched in the presentation of membership as an 
external constraint, despite the benefits that the country derived from it.   
 
At the same time, the socialist government was pursuing the policy of ‘socialisation’ 
of ailing private firms by putting them under ‘social’ (essentially state) control in an 
effort to fight unemployment.  In other words, whilst it had agreed at the European 
level to a process of gradual liberalisation of the economy, it was pursuing a 
completely different economic policy at the domestic level.  Thus, the second half of 
the 1980s was marked by the remarkable tensions between strategic decisions of its 
leadership (especially the decision to keep the country in the EC) on the one hand, and 
the preferences of the majority of its cadres many of whom occupied positions of 
power in the public sector (and its unions) and were the carriers of a mixture of 
populism and views inspired by the experience of the eastern bloc.   
 
The power of the advocates of these views, coupled with the predominantly defensive 
attitude towards membership of the EC, meant that the effort to rationalise the 
country’s finances was short-lived.  It became the victim of the rampant populism that 
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permeated the party as well as fears that the stabilisation programme pursued between 
1985 and 1987 would lead to electoral defeat.  The powerful populist section of the 
Cabinet (including ministers Tsovolas, Koutsoyiorgas and V. Papandreou) gave a 
hostile reception to Simitis’ proposals to align (i.e. limit) incomes policy with 
inflation but after the meeting (and once Simitis had made a public announcement) 
Andreas Papandreou,33 speaking in Parliament in the debate regarding the budget, 
distanced himself from his leading minister who, as a result, resigned in November 
1987.  That was the end of the stabilisation programme.  Populism and short-term 
electoral considerations had won to the detriment of the first attempt actively to 
engage with the EC in an effort to improve the country’s finances.  At the same time, 
it highlighted the major credibility problem that Papandreou had in the European 
context34.   
 
The transition to a new policy paradigm 
Although PASOK was compelled to focus on its political survival as a result of the 
scandals of the end of the 1980s, the Maastricht Treaty and the decision to launch the 
process of economic and monetary union (EMU) raised issues that the party could no 
longer avoid.  The fact that it was in opposition undoubtedly facilitated the reflection 
process but this remained confined to the party élite and was centred on prominent or 
ambitious members of its front bench35 and their personal initiatives rather than the 
party’s formal institutions (interviews).  In fact, the party itself did not engage in a 
meaningful and mature dialogue (interviews with former PASOK Cabinet members).  
The way in which the party leadership (specifically, Andreas Papandreou) dealt with 
the issue of the Maastricht Treaty is indicative of this (widely confirmed) absence of 
organised dialogue within the party (interviews).  Aware of the issues raised by the 
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Treaty, Papandreou dictated the party line: although PASOK MPs would vote in 
favour of the ratification of the Treaty, the rhetoric would highlight its deficiencies.  
For that purpose he chose Gerassimos Arsenis, to make the main speech on behalf of 
the socialists in Parliament.   
 
Arsenis had worked for the UN Conference on Trade and Development and while he 
was Minister of National Economy in the first PASOK government, he was the main 
exponent within the Cabinet of economic views that had been influenced by the 
experience of third world countries.  Unsurprisingly, he was also a left-wing critic of 
European integration; this is why he was chosen to represent PASOK on that 
occasion.  In his speeches in Parliament - both in the plenum and the economic affairs 
committee, Arsenis attacked not only the Treaty’s monetarist provisions regarding 
EMU but also the democratic deficit of the entire EMU edifice as well as the foreign 
policy- and defence-related provisions.   
 
His criticism of the Treaty echoed the views held by many social democrats across 
Europe: (i) EMU’s institutionalised emphasis on monetarism radically reduces the 
capacity to fight against unemployment and promote re-distribution; (ii) the 
institutional arrangements regarding the European Central Bank (ECB) actually 
increase the EC’s democracy deficit; (iii) the provisions regarding the common 
foreign and (more specifically) security policy seem to promote the objective of 
turning the WEU (and the EU) into the European branch of NATO instead of 
promoting the development of the EU’s capacity to act in the international scene.   
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Arsenis’ speech contains two noteworthy changes.  On the one hand, it was the first 
explicit acknowledgment of the inability of individual states to deal with many of the 
major problems faced by citizens (Hellenic Parliament debate, 27 July 1992, 9).  For a 
party and a country where the capacities of the states were often thought to be of 
Herculean proportions, this was a major change.  The internationalisation of capital, 
argued Arsenis, means that its accord with labour and the state will have to be 
developed at a higher (regional, if not global) level.  This is ‘the one-way route’ to a 
united Europe, as he put it, though it should involve the state as a key component, 
instead of seeking to eliminate it.  On the other hand, it explicitly rejected the notion 
that non-involvement was a viable policy, arguing instead that non-participants would 
simply be compelled to implement the decisions that participants (even weak ones) 
would make – only by participating in the process of integration can one build 
‘political Europe’ he said (Hellenic Parliament debate, 27 July 1992, 10).  Castigating 
the conservative government’s passive stance in the negotiations, he highlighted the 
experience of the mid-1980s regarding the IMPs which demonstrated that the socialist 
government’s active involvement in EC-level procedures had enabled it to promote 
the national interest.  This is an important point that PASOK later turned into one of 
the main planks of its European policy (see infra).   
 
Papandreou’s speech on that occasion was remarkable.  Placing the developments that 
led to the Maastricht Treaty in a wider international political and economic context, 
he pointed out the importance of (a) Germany’s relationship to Europe and (b) the 
idea that the rapid enlargement of the EC was likely to promote the interests of the 
USA by undermining the process of European integration and turning the EC to a 
mere free trade area.  He also acknowledged that Greece had no alternative.  It had to 
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follow the European route in an effort to promote the kind of Europe that PASOK 
preferred: a democratic Europe promoting re-distribution and economic development 
through a robust European budget, full employment, the welfare state, the protection 
of the environment and territorial integrity from any external threat (Hellenic 
Parliament debate, 27 July 1992, 39-41).  Finally, he returned to the familiar theme of 
Greek-Turkish relations by pointing out that the logic behind the Greek accession to 
the WEU had been undermined by the declaration whereby the members of the WEU 
re-interpreted the organisation’s clause on mutual assistance36.   
 
After PASOK’s landslide victory in the general election of October 199337 
participation in the third stage of EMU became one of the government’s main 
objectives (interview with former PASOK Cabinet minister).  The credibility of this 
commitment was demonstrated by Papandreou’s choice of Cabinet ministers.  Indeed, 
the task of preparing the country for this process was entrusted to a group of moderate 
and experienced ministers including centrists38 and social democrats39.  Mirroring the 
requirements of the Maastricht Treaty, the socialist government embarked on an 
orthodox programme of economic convergence (involving partial privatisations of 
state firms and reductions in public expenditure) similar to that followed by other 
member states in the 1980s40 (Tsakalotos 2001, 156-7).   
 
At the same time PASOK’s almost instinctive nationalism remained present in some 
aspects of the government’s foreign policy.  For example, it was evident in the 
conflict that opposed Th. Pangalos and George A. Papandreou on the one hand, and 
K. Papoulias on the other (interview).  Taking a hard line, the latter opposed EU 
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efforts to resolve the problems that stemmed from the establishment of the FYR of 
Macedonia as an independent state.  By contrast the former supported it.   
 
 
The Europeanist ‘intermezzo’41 
 
The risks created by the electoral sensitivities of the party’s leadership, the instability 
created by Andreas Papandreou’s poor health and the legacy of 1987 and the end of 
the first stabilisation programme meant that the continuation of this reform 
programme was far from guaranteed.  Nevertheless, Costas Simitis’ election as party 
leader and Prime Minister in January 1996 (confirmed after PASOK’s victory in the 
general election of 1996) quickly dispersed these fears42.  It marked the beginning of a 
new era that was characterised by the country’s most successful involvement in the 
process of integration and the pursuit by the PASOK government of the clearest and 
most avowedly social democratic agenda for Greece and the EU as a whole.   
 
Simitis – a man of conviction who had repeatedly clashed with the populist elements 
of PASOK’s leadership and resigned twice from senior Cabinet posts and once from 
the party’s Executive Bureau - saw the link between Greece and the process of 
integration as a potentially self-reinforcing tandem.  Greece stood to gain from a 
strong EU but only on condition of active and (above all) credible participation in the 
process of integration (Simitis 2005, 617).  Simitis was determined to transform 
Greece into a reliable member of the EU’s core group of states by accelerating the 
pursuit of the modernisation of the country and by taking an active interest in the 
major debates regarding the future of Europe.  He turned membership of EMU into 
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the core task of his government but this was just a part of his own vision for the 
modernisation of Greece and the future of Europe as a whole.  He was fully aware of 
the fact that the creation of the single currency would raise pressing and value-laden 
issues (including the major issue of political union) to which the social democrats 
ought to be able to respond (Simitis 2005).   
 
His action while in power was underpinned by an explicit and highly developed 
understanding of the challenges that social democracy faces in the beginning of the 
21st century.  He believed that, in conditions of growing interdependence – in 
particular in order to respond to the challenge of globalisation, the strategy of the Left 
should not be limited to the national level.  Rather, a political response to the growing 
autonomy of the market brought about by globalisation is a necessity.  This task is 
best carried out at the European level.  Turning the EU into a powerful actor capable 
of promoting growth, economic and social cohesion, the modernisation of the 
European social model, peace, security and prosperity would give the appropriate new 
meaning to the internationalism that characterised social democracy since its 
inception (Simitis 2005, 559, 563-4).   
 
Simitis’ vision regarding the future of Europe contained four key components that his 
government consistently promoted in the negotiations that led to the Amsterdam 
Treaty, the Nice Treaty and the Constitutional Treaty (Simitis 1995, 127-38; 2002, 99-
107; 2005, 126-7).  First, integration must move beyond the economic sphere.  The 
gradual transformation of the EU into a political union with strong and legitimate 
central institutions based on the federal model with the Commission holding executive 
power, the EP legislative power and the Council as the second (upper) legislature 
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representing states43 ought to be preferred to other existing models (including the 
Europe of concentric circles and Europe à la carte) because they do not rely on the 
rules and logic of democracy44.  Second, although the Maastricht criteria do not attach 
sufficient importance to employment, and economic and social cohesion, they should 
not be abolished because individual states (acting on their own) cannot cope with the 
challenges posed in an increasingly interdependent world.  The real alternative is to 
(a) turn real economic convergence into a core component of an economic policy that 
will promote full employment and (b) transform the Union into a leading actor in the 
management of the global economy.  Third, the EU should promote the enhancement 
of the social dimension of integration in an effort to promote growth as well as the 
protection and adaptation of the European social model to new technological and 
demographic challenges.  This should be combined with a more specific policy for the 
promotion of industrial competitiveness.  In that context, the EU’s re-distributive 
capacity ought to be enhanced and solidarity should replace the notion of juste retour.  
Finally, the Union will be incomplete as long as it does not possess the institutions 
and the policies that will enable it to play a more active and effective role in 
international politics promoting the establishment of a multi-polar order based on 
international law, conflict prevention, crisis management and the protection of its own 
external frontiers on the basis of the principle of solidarity.   
 
One major change - in comparison to the 1980s - was the leadership’s (specifically 
Simitis’) willingness to make a positive case in public in favour of turning Greece 
from an awkward into a credible, confident and constructive partner.  For a party (and 
a country) that had been used to a rather confrontational attitude marked by the 
government’s Promethean role as the protector of the national interest, Simitis’ 
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attitude marked a radical break with the past.  Simitis was willing to talk openly about 
the fact that (a) membership of the EU entailed opportunities as well as constraints 
(unlike his predecessors who had often emphasised the latter in an effort to shift the 
blame for unpopular policies) and (b) one could not hope to turn the country into a 
credible partner capable of participating in core debates regarding the future of 
Europe without fulfilling the obligations that its governments had previously 
accepted.  More importantly, unlike his predecessors, Simitis realised that the advent 
of the Euro had the capacity to mobilise public opinion that was tired of the scandals 
and the political turmoil that marked the end of the 1980s and the early 1990s.  Unlike 
prominent members of the party leadership who advocated a slow adjustment to the 
criteria for the adoption of the Euro (to a large extent because of electoral 
considerations) Simitis imposed the adoption of the Euro (simultaneously with the 
core members of the Euro zone) as the primary objective of his first government.   
 
The economic programme that led to the adoption of the single currency as part of the 
first wave of member states that entered the Euro zone reflected the need to fulfil the 
relevant formal criteria but also the deficiencies of the Greek economy as well as the 
need to ensure that the weaker social strata were protected from the negative effects of 
adaptation.  In order to achieve these objectives the government combined two sets of 
measures.  The first entailed the more systematic, rapid and determined 
implementation of the orthodox45 economic programme of the last Papandreou 
government.  The more pronounced efforts to reduce inflation and public debt46 were 
coupled this time with the more sustained fight against tax evasion and greater 
emphasis on market liberalisation.  The second (and more innovative) set of measures 
entailed the reform of local government47, the establishment of autonomous regulatory 
Published in Social Democracy and European Integration: The Politics of Preference Formation, 
edited by D. G. Dimitrakopoulos, 117-156. London/New York: Routledge, 2010. 
- 236 - 
agencies and, above all, an extremely ambitious programme for the modernisation of 
the country’s infrastructure48.  This programme was important for two reasons.  On 
the one hand, it was designed to facilitate economic activity and improve standards of 
living.  On the other hand, it was meant to create jobs and thus absorb a significant 
part of the pressures on employment created by the Maastricht criteria.  These 
measures were coupled with the government’s social policy that was aimed at 
protecting the most vulnerable social strata49.  
 
This happened as a result of a conscious decision to reduce defence spending50.  In 
turn, this change was facilitated by the management of Greece’s relations with Turkey 
on a multilateral (i.e. European) rather than a bilateral basis, itself a key innovation 
introduced by Simitis and pursued by his government.  This entailed the pursuit of 
long-standing Greek views but in a way that highlighted the EU-wide stakes.  Seizing 
the opportunity offered by the Turkish government’s objective of full membership of 
the EU, the Simitis government ended the isolation of Greece that stemmed from the 
fact that successive Greek governments had vetoed efforts aimed at developing 
Turkey’s relationship with the EU.  Although this policy had its roots in Turkey’s 
aggressive policy – exemplified by the Imia crisis that took place during Simitis’ first 
days in office, it had also run its course51.  Simitis realised that Greece stood to gain 
(at least in terms of reductions in defence expenditure) from transforming the role of 
the EU in that respect.  This is why he sought to turn the EU from a forum into an 
active mechanism for the implementation of a long-term strategy that entailed the 
promotion of democratisation in Turkey and the accession of Cyprus to the EU 
(interview with former PASOK Cabinet minister).   
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His modernisation project and his ambitious Europeanism were also couched in his 
belief that the statism that had informed PASOK’s worldview and practice until 1996 
had reached its limits (Simitis 2005, 561).  Aware of the ability of special interests to 
penetrate the state and the inability of the latter to defend itself (and society) against 
clientelism, Simitis was willing to break with his party’s quasi-institutionalised 
statism and promote the état-stratège.  The policy of (partial or total) privatisation of 
some public firms and the emphasis that he placed on a network of regulatory 
agencies were the direct consequence of his views52.   
 
Another facet of his scepticism vis-à-vis his party’s traditional conception of statism 
was reflected in his support for supranational institutions as well as the gradual 
extension of QMV, against PASOK’s traditional attachment to unanimity on foreign 
policy issues.  Though Simitis did not deny that the extension of QMV should not 
happen prior to the development (at EU level) of common principles, policy 
objectives and the mechanisms that would put them into effect, he was willing to state 
openly, unlike his predecessors, that unanimity had also been counter-productive for 
Greek interests53.   
 
Although Simitis undoubtedly innovated in terms of both the policy that he pursued 
and the method that he employed, his tenure as leader of PASOK and Prime Minister 
was remarkably consistent with that of Andreas Papandreou in one key respect.  It 
confirmed the pattern of presidentialism that permeates preference formation in 
PASOK since 1974.  Simitis was a long-standing and vocal proponent of intra-party 
democracy.  While he was party leader and Prime Minister both party fora and 
Cabinet committees met regularly54.  Thus, party members and officials as well as 
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government ministers had the opportunity to express any dissenting views.  
Nevertheless, this did not happen for two reasons.  First, there was no coherent 
alternative.  Second, PASOK did not have an established tradition of internal political 
debate.  Between 1996 and 2004 the party remained a passive observer of Simitis’ 
initiatives, secure in the knowledge that his personal popularity ratings were 
extremely high and that he had the personal credibility that enabled him to win two 
consecutive electoral contests.  Indeed, under Simitis PASOK increased both its 
overall number and share of votes55.   
 
Although his vision regarding the future of Europe and the position of Greece therein 
was undoubtedly shared by a number of senior and junior government ministers, his 
legacy does not appear to have taken root within the party.  His successor, George A. 
Papandreou (the eldest son of Andreas), has chosen a different course of action.   
 
 
After Simitis: PASOK’s ‘exodus’56 from Europeanism 
 
The pattern that emerged since George A. Papandreou’s election as leader of PASOK 
in 200457 confirms the predominance of leadership as a key explanatory factor in 
preference formation on European integration.  Nevertheless, it is important to divide 
this period into two distinct phases that reflect novel features in (a) the development 
of PASOK as a political party and (b) the nature of its preferences on European 
integration.  The first phase commenced with Papandreou’s elevation to the leadership 
of the party in February 2004 and ended with the party’s seventh conference in March 
2005.  The second phase begun with the Dutch and French referenda on the 
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Constitutional Treaty (May-June 2005).  The former is marked by the enduring 
presence of key traits of the Simitis era in terms of the party’s formal ideological and 
programmatic platform and its internal organisation and leading team.  The latter is 
clearly marked by the new leader’s ideological, programmatic as well as personnel-
related choices.  Crucially, PASOK’s presence in the opposition benches gave it the 
opportunity to revise its programme, strategy and tactics ahead of the next general 
election.   
 
George A. Papandreou’s elevation to the leadership of the party was the result of a 
novel process both in terms of the party’s history and the broader Greek political 
culture.  As a result of plans that were afoot since June 2003 (Simitis 2005, 592), 
Papandreou met Simitis in the latter’s private residence on 6 January 2004.  In 
addition to Simitis’ personal decision to hand over58 to Papandreou the party’s 
leadership and the responsibility for the election campaign59, they agreed to (i) revise 
the party’s procedure for the selection of leader and (ii) call an early election in March 
2004.  On Papandreou’s initiative, the new leader would be ‘elected’ directly by party 
members and supporters (or ‘friends’60), rather than the party conference as had 
hitherto been the case.  This required the reform of the party’s charter.  This reform 
was formally endorsed by the party’s extraordinary conference held on 6 February 
2004.  George A. Papandreou was the only candidate.  As a result, his ‘victory’ was 
entirely expected61.  However, two key features of this process deserve to be 
highlighted for they were politically consequential (see infra).   
 
First, the participation of more than one million members and ‘friends’62 (PASOK 
2004d) was both surprising and unprecedented.  This process was not as democratic 
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as it seemed at the time.  Indeed, it was more akin to a referendum or a crowning than 
an election.  The latter requires not only the participation of competitors but also 
explicit political platforms.  Moreover, the fact that (i) Simitis had already designated 
George A. Papandreou (whose surname was - and remains – his major political asset 
in the eyes of many of the party’s core voters) and (ii) the party was about to face a 
general election after 13 consecutive years in power effectively precluded the 
possibility of alternative candidatures and the oxygen of political contestation that it 
would provide.  Nobody was willing to risk appearing to divide the party.  Second, 
Papandreou’s elevation to the leadership of the party was couched in an unspecified 
platform of ‘radical change’.  Indeed, his involvement in public meetings, party 
gatherings and election rallies was dominated by one slogan: ‘George, change 
everything!’ which he openly endorsed.  The combined effect of these two facts gave 
Papandreou a personal, strong but unspecified mandate which appeared to be the 
political equivalent of a blank cheque.  Nevertheless, PASOK suffered heavy defeats 
both in the general election of March 200463 and the European elections of June 
200464.  As a consequence, both the party and its new leader, now in opposition, could 
begin to re-assess its ideological and broader political position as well as its internal 
organisation.   
 
During the two electoral campaigns PASOK’s formal rhetoric on European 
integration remained remarkably consistent with the avant-garde left-wing federalism 
that characterised the Simitis era (PASOK 2004a; 2004b; 2004c).  Most of these 
preferences were re-affirmed at the party’s seventh conference held in March 2005 
(PASOK 2005).  More specifically, the party re-affirmed its strategic attachment to 
the country’s European orientation (PASOK 2004b, 198), and the quest for ‘a strong 
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Greece in a potent and progressive Europe for the management of globalisation’, i.e. 
two core components of Simitis’ policy (Simitis 2005; 2007a, 24).  Indeed, Simitis 
had explicitly and unequivocally linked the country’s prospects and his government’s 
social democratic policy with ‘the debate on the future of Europe and its role in the 
world’ (Simitis 2005, 125; 564).   
 
The party explicitly construed the country’s future as being part of Europe’s political 
union since ‘a strong Europe will guarantee multilateralism and the democratic and 
peaceful governance of globalisation’ (PASOK 2004a, 2), supported those who seek 
the rapid pursuit of a federal Europe equipped with its own constitution, defence and 
foreign policy (PASOK 2005, 7 and 31) and regarded Greece as being capable of 
participating in enhanced co-operation arrangements in defence (PASOK 2004c, 12).   
In addition, the party formally endorsed the mainstream social democratic agenda of a 
social, environmentally sustainable and multicultural Europe coupled with a powerful 
and democratically legitimate economic policy and institutions.  It also re-affirmed its 
commitment to economic and social cohesion and the enhancement of the Union’s re-
distributive capacity, including its budget.  Finally, PASOK explicitly endorsed the 
2004 enlargement, as well as the prospect of the accession of both Turkey and the 
countries of the Western Balkans65.   
 
The lengthy process of internal re-organisation begun in spring 2004 and culminated 
in the adoption of the new charter and internal structure at the party conference of 
March 2005.  The aim of the establishment of the new, so-called ‘open party’, was to 
turn PASOK from an elitist and hierarchically-organised party into a decentralised 
network of members and ‘friends’ - including immigrants and representatives of civil 
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society – marked, in addition, by the participation of more women66.  The internal 
reform of the party was aimed at promoting the principle and the means of 
participatory democracy67 and improving the standard of its cadres largely through 
the use of IT.  In reality though, PASOK has remained a catch-all party with a 
governmental vocation.  The enhanced legitimacy of the new leader significantly 
increased his margin of discretion in terms of policy making, as well as the 
appointment of the party’s senior cadres and, of course, the front bench.  George A. 
Papandreou’s PASOK is decidedly presidential and this had a direct impact on 
preference formation on European integration.   
 
The ratification of the Constitutional Treaty by the Hellenic Parliament in April 
200568 was the last significant event of the first phase of George A. Papandreou’s 
tenure.  Speaking during the parliamentary debate, not only did he re-affirm the 
party’s Europeanism – explicitly drawing on his own role in (and the contribution of 
the Simitis government to) the Convention on the Future of Europe and the first stage 
of the subsequent IGC – but he also contrasted them to the conservative government’s 
passivity and called for a referendum69 (Hellenic Parliament debate, 15 April 2005, 
7554-6).  This demand was also supported by left-wing opposition parties and was 
later formally submitted to Parliament.  The proposal was debated in Parliament on 12 
May 2005 but the ruling conservative majority rejected it70.   
 
Two events marked the commencement of the second phase of Papandreou’s tenure 
as leader and the beginning of a gradual shift in his position (as well that of the party) 
on European integration, namely the negative outcome of the referenda in France and 
the Netherlands (May and June 2005) and his appointment as President of the 
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Socialist International in January 2006.  George A. Papandreou’s political discourse 
(speeches, articles, etc.) is indicative of the aforementioned shift and took even more 
specific form in the leadership’s formal proposal (March 2007) submitted ahead of the 
conference that defined the party’s new programme.   
 
Two key features stand out (Papandreou 2005, 4; 2006a).  First, Papandreou 
abandoned the Constitutional Treaty just weeks after the referendum in the 
Netherlands.  Later on he made very vague references to the need for an EU 
Constitution comprising two parts – one on the principles and values of the EU and 
one on its the decision making mechanisms (Papandreou 2006b, 4) – without 
articulating a clear alternative for the crisis that permeated the EU.  At the same time, 
he criticised the conservative government for failing to participate in the ongoing 
discussion on the future of Europe (Hellenic Parliament debate, 4 February 2007, 83).  
Both he and senior officials of his choosing openly supported the view that the debate 
on the institutions of the EU was irrelevant after the French and Dutch referenda and 
that priority lies with the definition of policies that would concretely respond to 
citizens’ needs and wishes (interviews).  In other words, Papandreou clearly broke 
with Simitis’ strategy that directly linked the reform of the Union’s institutions with 
the policies that they produce.  Second, there has been a marked shift away from the 
European integration-centred frame of reference on which both he and the party had 
drawn until then.  Instead, Papandreou consistently drew on more abstract 
cosmopolitan references and concepts such as ‘global governance’, ‘global 
democracy’, ‘global citizenry’ etc71.  In his discourse European integration did not 
appear to be linked directly (or even principally) to the objective of the ‘humanisation 
[…] and democratisation of globalisation’, i.e. the main priorities of the new 
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leadership72.  Thus, Papandreou and the party gradually moved away from Simitis’ 
project, message and strategy.  Unlike Simitis, they opted for vague references to ‘a 
strong Greece in Europe and in the world’ (PASOK 2007)73.  Although this emerging 
frame of reference informed much of the party’s literature that was published on the 
occasion of the seventh conference, it was obscured by the Europeanist discourse on 
which Papandreou had to rely during the debate on the Constitutional Treaty – a 
milestone in his tenure as Minister of Foreign Affairs.  The swift abandonment of the 
Constitutional Treaty and Papandreou’s appointment as President of the Socialist 
International accelerated the transition from Simitis’ left-wing federalism to what 
Papandreou calls ‘global revolution’ (Papandreou 2006a; 2007c), i.e. a cosmopolitan 
‘new internationalism’ that promotes the democratisation of neo-liberal globalisation 
through the co-ordination of citizens’ action.  In other words, Papandreou increasingly 
identifies with and refers to his new role (Papandreou 2006c; 2007a) from which he 
tries to draw ideas, policies as well as his personal political identity.  Indeed, he has 
publicly argued that today PASOK ‘has a global presence and can take initiatives and 
engage in battles across the globe via the Socialist International’ (Papandreou 2007b, 
7).  Moreover, while he draws systematically on his role as President of the Socialist 
International in his rare appearances in meetings of the Party of European Socialists, 
he does not give the same prominence to his role as leader of a party of an EU 
member state in his much more frequent appearances and speeches in gatherings of 
the Socialist International74. 
 
In terms of the aims and the scope of integration, PASOK’s and Papandreou’s ‘new 
agenda’ construes Europe as the country’s natural strategic space.  Although political 
union formally remains an objective (PASOK 2007, 100) it is rarely present in 
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Papandreou’s discourse.  Indeed, in a statement issued on the occasion of the 50th 
anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Rome he opted for the more vague75 term 
‘political Europe’ (Papandreou 2007d).  As regards the EU’s international role, 
although frequent reference is made to the need for a more autonomous or stronger 
European voice (PASOK 2007, 100), the need for a multi-polar system based on 
international law, consultation and the peaceful resolution of conflicts, these 
statements remain quite abstract while references to CFSP, ESDP and the 
development of the Union’s political and military crisis management capabilities have 
disappeared completely from the terminology used both by the party leader and the 
party’s official literature (ibid).  The increasingly abstract references to the EU’s 
autonomous international role are deprived of an explicit statement of the instruments 
that could turn it into reality.  So, they do little more than obscure George A. 
Papandreou’s latent Atlanticism76 or, at best, a preference for Europe construed as an 
area.  Indeed, although he was very quick to abandon the Constitutional Treaty, he 
remained attached to the idea of further enlargement (Turkey and Western Balkans) 
which he dissociates from the Union’s crisis (Papandreou 2006e, 4) despite the fact 
that ‘enlargement fatigue’77 was, arguably, a major contributing factor in the outcome 
of the French and Dutch referenda.  In other words, changes that risk diluting the EU 
even further remain firmly on his agenda.  Nevertheless, PASOK did not refrain from 
supporting the notion of deepening integration – e.g. by means of a larger common 
budget, support for policies on economic cohesion, R&D - and the expansion of the 
agenda of the ECB to include growth and employment, although the absence of 
references to a gouvernement économique or economic governance and the re-
balancing of economic and monetary policy is striking.   
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Furthermore, the shift in emphasis in terms of institutional reform of the Union is 
both obvious and spectacular.  Simitis’ left-wing federalism (see supra) has been 
ostracised and replaced by abstract references to a ‘democratic Europe’ (PASOK 
2007, 100).  PASOK’s and Papandreou’s78 silence on institutional reform is coupled 
with frequent references to the need for the country’s active involvement in the 
relevant debate and ‘the avant-garde of the countries that can and wish to go ahead’ 
(PASOK 2007, 100).  The combination of Papandreou’s insistence on further 
enlargement – despite the significant and vocal opposition to it both in Greece and in 
other member states – and the abandonment of Simitis’ emphasis on institutional 
reform leads to the conclusion that Papandreou appears to espouse an Anglo-Saxon 
agenda and rejects Simitis’ more balanced and holistic strategy.   
 
These remarks reflect the platform (approved by Papandreou) on the basis of which 
the party’s new programme was effectively adopted at the conference of May 2007 
(PASOK 2007).  This text was subsequently presented verbatim as the party’s 
manifesto and remains to date the most important point of reference.  In that respect, 
five key points deserve to be highlighted.  First, this political platform that was meant 
to channel and inform the debate within the party is PASOK’s first and only text 
issued since 200579.  Second, it has been personally approved by Papandreou.  Third, 
it bears striking resemblance to Ségolène Royal’s Pacte présidentiel in terms of its 
form (i.e. a mere list of objectives and policy proposals), the basic concepts and 
keywords – including participatory democracy, proximity to the citizen, 
decentralisation, fair society - that it utilises (Moschonas 2007) - and the parallel 
debates that it has generated (on the cost of these proposals and the origin of funding).  
Fourth, after the conference, the text re-appeared in the form of PASOK’s government 
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programme although it refers to the Constitutional Treaty even after the meeting of 
the European Council in Brussels in late June 2007.  Finally, it is permeated by a 
pronounced cosmopolitan element highlighted by extensive references to a ‘global 
agenda’ and the role of socialists (be they Greek or not) in promoting it whilst its 
European component is remarkably feeble and almost entirely buried under vague and 
ambiguous statements.  Indeed, less than one of the document’s 123 pages is 
dedicated to European integration construed as both an objective and the means to an 
end (i.e. PASOK’s preferences under Simitis).  The ‘new’, ‘patriotic’ and 
‘internationalist’ PASOK construes Europe not as an actor that plays ‘an autonomous, 
powerful and progressive’ international role promoting peace, co-operation, 
development and security (PASOK 2005, 31) but as a mere area of peace and co-
operation (PASOK 2007, 98) that ought to be enlarged80.   
 
These changes in PASOK’s preferences reflect the broader political context in which 
they occurred.  Numerous opinion polls indicated that PASOK lagged behind the 
ruling conservative party and appeared to be incapable of reversing this trend.  
Papandreou’s tactics and his capacity to lead the party were widely and openly 
questioned and criticised (The Economist, 7-13 April 2007, 43).  As regards European 
affairs specifically, Papandreou often berated the conservative government and the 
Prime Minister personally for (a) undermining the country’s status within the EU, (b) 
their inability to manage and increase the structural funds earmarked for Greece and 
(c) their policy on Cyprus and Turkey’s accession bid (e.g. Hellenic Parliament 
debate, 2 November 2006, 767).  On the other hand, neither the reform of the Union 
nor domestic issues with a pronounced EU dimension were used as part of PASOK’s 
opposition tactics81.  Rather, Papandreou argued that the conservative government and 
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the EU had colluded in an effort to promote ‘harmful solutions’ in pension reform in 
exchange for ending the supervision of the country’s public finances under EMU rules 
(Eleftherotypia, 12 May 2007).   
 
Papandreou’s elevation to the leadership of the party on a radical internal reform 
platform highlighted (i) the lack of trust in traditional leading party figures as well as 
Simitis’ modernisers and (ii) the new leader’s wish to rejuvenate the party in terms of 
personnel (politicians and cadres)82. In addition, both during the process of the party’s 
re-organisation (May 2004 – March 2005) and since the establishment of the ‘new’, 
so-called ‘open’ party (March 2005) numerous overlapping committees and task 
forces were established within the party in an effort to define party policy and tactics.  
The establishment of these bodies was often advertised with great fanfare but they 
failed to produce any meaningful output (interview).  Indeed, their operation revealed 
a serious lack of co-ordination83 - both because there was no visible, coherent front 
bench and because the party essentially lacks a clear référentiel and convincing 
programmatic beliefs coupled with the corresponding tactics (interview).  As a result, 
internal strife, insecurity and incoherence ensued as exemplified by frequent public 
and bitter internal disputes.  This, in turn, further accelerated the pace of PASOK’s 
presidentialisation and the personalisation of the party’s leadership.  Papandreou’s 
leadership is couched in the constant but incoherent use of ‘surprise tactics’ whereby 
the leader suddenly announces in public the party’s position on political issues that 
dominate the national agenda.  In other words, a new, aristocratic-authoritarian84 and 
ultimately unconvincing presidential style has emerged.  It is couched not in 
democratic control but on the tactical use of uncertainty and the surprise effect.  The 
most telling (without being the only) example of George A. Papanderou’s 
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authoritarian style was the former party leader and Prime Minister Costas Simitis’ 
expulsion (between June 2008 and March 2009) from the  parliamentary party due to 
his public disagreement with the party’s proposal to hold a referendum for the 
ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon85 
 
Under George A. Papandreou PASOK’s exodus from the Europeanism of the Simitis 
era appears to entail an aristocratic-authoritarian style coupled with a cosmopolitan 
message inspired by the new leader’s Atlanticist instincts.  Papandreou combined an 
autonomous style of operation (beyond any collective body or procedure) and a 
vague, elitist and seemingly normative conception of global politics that is devoid of 
any reference to either specific forms of government or methods leading to ‘global 
democracy’.  This is unsurprising since – with the notable exception of the Simitis era 
- the entire Greek political class has developed a habit of simply re-acting (as opposed 
to contributing) to the EU agenda.  The latter defines the range of the domestic 
political debate on Europe.  Paraphrasing Simitis, we argue that if ‘the others’ do not 
produce a vision for Europe, ‘we’ are deprived of a sense of direction in ‘our’ debates.  
However, as Simitis rightly argued, no meaningful political vision can be bestowed or 
‘donated’; rather, it can only be the result of active civic engagement in political strife 
coupled with a critical assessment of the status quo (Simitis 2007, 16).  This is why 
PASOK entered the September 2007 general election campaign deprived of a vision 
for Europe at a time when the debate on the new treaty was being actively re-
launched.   
 
In addition to the gradual and subtle though manifest shift to the aforementioned new 
kind of rhetoric, Papandreou effectively began downplaying the importance of the 
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ongoing debate regarding the future of the EU.  This is exemplified by his reluctance 
to even raise the issue or comment on important developments.  In contrast, in the past 
he could have been expected to make a statement (at least in his capacity as President 
of the Socialist International) on the occasion of an event of EU-wide importance – 
such as the meeting of the European Council in Brussels in June 2007 that drafted the 
mandate and decided to convene the formal IGC that led to the Treaty of Lisbon– to 
make a statement and express his views.  However, this did not happen, even on the 
occasion of the conclusion of the Treaty of Lisbon in October 2007.  His silence (and 
that of his party) was deafening86. Equally telling was his (and his party’s) limited 
interest in a substantive debate both in Parliament and Greece as a whole on the 
occasion of the ratification of the Treay of Lisbon a year later87.   
 
More importantly, despite the debate and the conference that endorsed the new 
programme in May 2007, the party did not fight the general election of September 
2007 on that basis.  Rather, Papandreou decided to fight the election on the basis of a 
campaign focused on two persons, namely him and the Prime Minister.  PASOK’s 
heavy defeat in that general election88 triggered a leadership challenge.  In that 
context, the main challenger (Ev. Venizelos, a former academic lawyer and Cabinet 
member) fought the leadership election largely on a platform that drew inspiration 
from Simitis’ strategy and objectives on European integration.  The leadership 
campaign revealed that senior frontbenchers disagreed with Papandreou’s views.  
Indeed, based on a sophisticated analysis of the tensions between (a) European 
integration on the one hand and (ii) the distinction between the Left and the Right, 
Venizelos supported not only the explicit politicisation of European integration but 
also the pursuit of Simitis’ entire left-wing federalist agenda (including, for example, 
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the transformation of the EU into a pillar of a multi-polar international system) even 
before the leadership campaign had kicked off (Venizelos 2006).  This demonstrated 
clearly the EU-related political consequences of the party ‘referendum’ of 2004. 
Dissenting voices were silenced and the exigencies of retaining (or re-gaining) power 
shifted attention away from Europe even within a self-proclaimed ‘pro-European’ 
party.  Nevertheless, even this incident proves the main argument put forward in this 
chapter: the leader rules.  Papandreou comfortably won the leadership election of 11 
November 200789.   
 
Finally, it is worth noting the confusion and contradictions that characterise the party 
think-tank’s (ISTAME 2009) proposals that were issued ahead of the 2009 European 
elections.  This is ISTAME’s first text on Europe90 after the leadership election and 
can therefore be said to fully express the party’s new leader91.  While the authors of 
the text make a clear attempt to provide answers to the major isues that confront the 
EU - on the basis of the key question: how much and what kind of Europe do we 
want? (ISTAME 2009, 4) – and rely on mainstream Europeanist terminology and old 
(EMU, political union) as well as new concepts (such as ‘politicisation’92) they also 
make confusing and unclear (as to the desired result) proposals including (i) the direct 
election of the President of the Commission or even the President of the European 
Council (!)93, and (ii) the limitation of the Commission’s exclusive power of 
legislative initiative which, if implemented, would deal a major blow to the 
Community method94, etc. Finally, while the authors of the text pay lip service to the 
wish to see the EU become ‘a stabilisation force within its geo-political sphere and a 
strong pillar in the new international architecture as a peaceful and democratic step 
towards a new multi-polar world’ (ISTAME 2009,41-49), no reference whatsoever is 
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made to the means that would make this happen, and the reference to the objective of 
a common defence and security policy is at best vague - even in comparison to the 
Union’s acquis; rather the option of the development of the EU into a ‘soft power’95 is 
presented axiomatically (ISTAME 2009, 46). 
 
Despite having initially under-estimated the 2009 European election’s political stake, 
both PASOK and George A. Papandreou, subsequently turned the contest into a 
referendum regarding the popularity of the conservative goveernment (Papandreou 
2009a). The slogan ‘we vote on Europe, we decide on Greece’ that they deployed 
(Papandreou 2009c) is indicative in that respect.  In electoral terms this was a 
successful strategy with the electoral result96 paving the way for PASOK’s (and 
Papandreou’s) major victory in the early general election of 4 October 200997. 
 
 
Interests, institutions or ideas? 
 
Unlike the other four cases examined in this volume where (as the other contributions 
reveal) several independent variables have – over time – come to play a role in 
preference formation on European integration and, as a consequence, a more 
significant dose of nuance is required, the case of PASOK can be summarised in a 
manner that highlights one key variable that has played (and still plays) a decisive role 
in during the party’s almost four decades in Greek political life.  The primacy of the 
leader is the single most important and enduringly influential factor in the making of 
the party’s preferences on European intgration.  The leader of the party chooses the 
broad direction, scope and content of the party’s preferences on European integration, 
Published in Social Democracy and European Integration: The Politics of Preference Formation, 
edited by D. G. Dimitrakopoulos, 117-156. London/New York: Routledge, 2010. 
- 253 - 
as well as strategy and tactics used to pursue them.  From Andreas G. Papandreou, 
through to Costas Simitis and even George A. Papandreou, the leader of the party is 
both a substantial actor within the party and a figurehead whose actions (when the 
party is in office) and rhetoric (when the party is in the opposition benches) 
exemplifies what the party (and the government) as a whole stand for on the central 
issue of European intgeration.  However, this does not mean that the content, clarity 
and specificity of these preferences does not vary over time. Rather, only between 
1996 and 2004 (i.e. when the party and government were led by Costas Simitis) did 
the party have a clear objective and strategy with regards to the future of European 
integration, indeed one that was couched in core social democratic values coupled 
with an explicit belief in federalism, i.e. what we called ‘left-wing federalism’.  
Variation over time is directly linked to the primacy of the leader (since the content of 
the party’s preferences and strategy change when the party chooses a new leader) but 
cannot conceal the influence of (nor can it be completely separated from) other 
independent variables mentioned in the introductory chapter.   
 
Electoral, economic and geo-strategic interests have played a role in preference 
formation in this case but their impact has been mediated by the leader’s role.  The 
two Papandreous have linked European integration and domestic electoral 
considerations, calling for referenda aiming at making political capital against the 
ruling conservative ND.  Less ephemeral has been the influence of economic and geo-
strategic interests.  Both Andreas G. Papandreou and Costas Simitis have sought – in 
different ways – to enhance the EU’s re-distributive capacity because they were aware 
of the exigencies of the Greek economy and (in Simitis’ case) the medium- to long-
term implications of this mechanism for the process of integration as a whole.  
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Finally, geo-strategic interests have (implicitly or explicitly) influenced preference 
formation though the outcome has, again, been mediated by the leader’s views as well 
as the development of the EU.  This is exemplified by the party’s (more accurately, 
the government’s) stance on Greek-Turkish relations and the role of the EU therein.  
While under Andreas Papandreou the EU was seen as little more than just another 
forum where Greece had to defend its interests, the development of the EU, the 
realisation of the limits of this strategy and Simitis’ belief that the EU could become 
the means for the protection of the national interest, have led PASOK to formally 
accept Turkey as a candidate whose accession prospects would rely on progress made 
in bilateral issues as well as the issue of Cyprus.   
 
The primacy of the leader also reflects the impact of domestic political culture.  The 
two main parties (PASOK and ND) have traditionally been top-heavy and very 
centralised.  Far from fostering a culture of internal debate (found in other social 
democratic parties such as the Swedish SAP)98, the primacy of the leader reflects the 
broader weakness of civil society in Greece (Mouzelis and Pagoulatos 2002).  When 
Costas Simitis was in charge, he created numerous opportunities for internal debate 
but he could not create his interlocutors as well.   
 
Finally, in terms of ideas, populism, initially, modernisation along social democratic 
lines in the second half of the 1990s, have also been found to have had an impact on 
preference formation.  Populism has been a useful electoral tool during the tenure of 
the two Papandreous as party leaders but even they differ from each other in that 
Andreas was striving to make a coherent party (papering over the genuine differences 
that existed therein) out of a diverse protest movement in the immediate post-junta 
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period, while George’s insistence on a referendum appeared in a mature democracy.  
On the other hand, Simitis’ left-wing federalism has been explicitly (and deliberately) 
associated with a modernisation agenda, in part as an effort to overcome resistance to 
change (in terms of domestic, European and foreign policy) by depicting it as archaic 
and outdated.  The content of this modernisation agenda also reveals the influence of 
the policy paradigm which entailed a change of focus from (i) the ‘state’ to the 
‘public’ and (ii) the ‘national’ defined along domestic lines to a definition that links it 
inextricably to the ‘European’.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Two sets of conclusions can be drawn from the preceding analysis.  First, the case of 
PASOK provides no support for either the obfuscation or the dependence theses.  As 
regards the former, support for European integration has not been used by PASOK in 
an effort ‘to compensate for failure and retrenchment at the national level’, nor was it 
a vehicle for the mobilisation of support by the party ‘despite the absence of 
substantive social democratic policy output’ (Bailey 2005, 14).  Indeed, membership 
of the EU has generated concrete evidence indicate that action beyond the nation state 
can promote a social democratic agenda.  Moreover, in this case there is no link 
between continued membership and active engagement on the one hand, with a fear of 
national exclusion on the other (Haahr 1993, 263).  By contrast, this case indicates a 
degree of support for the instrumental view of European integration (Sassoon 1996, 
734).  Integration has been used as the means to achieve the regulation of markets (at 
the supranational level) as well as the modernisation of Greece – a country whose 
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political élite openly acknowledges the weaknesses of the nation state.  However, this 
begs the question: how did this come about?  In other words, was this choice (i) 
enduring and (ii) linked to interest-based, institutional or ideational factors?   
 
Evidence clearly indicates that PASOK did not perform the U-turn that has been 
ascribed to it.  Rather, its initial robust rhetoric has obscured the party’s more nuanced 
but real position: the terms of membership mattered99 because Greece was facing 
specific economic, political and geo-strategic issues.  Although electoral 
considerations and the diversity of the ideological orientations of its leading élite were 
undoubtedly important factors in shaping the party’s initial rhetoric, the decisive role 
of the leader cannot be concealed.  In Andreas Papandreou’s early PASOK, electoral 
considerations provided an important motive whilst the absence of a clearly defined 
and articulated positive ideological platform deprived the party of a yardstick against 
which existing alternative views could be assessed.  In that historically defined 
context, the party leader effectively acted as a primus solus.  In fact, this is the 
dominant and enduring feature of preference formation on European integration 
within PASOK.   
 
Focusing exclusively on this institutionalist explanation can be misleading.  After all, 
political institutions reflect the balance of power that characterises the context in 
which they are created.  Indeed, the party as such has never been actively involved in 
policy making both when it was in opposition and – even more so – when it was in 
power.  In that sense the top-heavy PASOK exemplifies Greek political culture that is 
marked by the absence of the ethos of debate on major issues100. This does not 
promote joint ‘ownership’ of party preferences that inevitably become short-lived.  
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This also indicates the decidedly elitist nature of the party (and preference formation 
within it), as well as the the shallow nature of the apparent ‘Europeanisation’ of the 
Greek political class.  ‘Europe does not sell’, one is told.  How will it (irrespective of 
its precise meaning) ‘sell’ when no-one dares speak about it?   
 
 
 
                                                
NOTES 
1 We are grateful to several PASOK MPs, MEPs, party and government officials, Cabinet members and 
former European Commissioners who gave confidential interviews for the purposes of this project 
(see appendix). The interviews were conducted between March 2006 and February 2007, i.e. when 
the party was in opposition.  The list that appears in the appendix indicates the interviewees’ 
institutional role or position at that point it time.  Dionyssis G. Dimitrakopoulos gratefully 
acknowledges the financial support provided by the School of Politics and Sociology, Birkbeck 
College, University of London and Maria Zampara’s contribution to tracing obscure publications 
from the Greek book market.   
2 The EEC and NATO are the same syndicate.   
3 Despite its rhetoric, the party (and its leader) was, at least since 1977, in search of a policy platform 
that would manage to reconcile contradictory demands stemming from the party’s diverse social 
basis, its activists and competing members of its leadership.   
4 It obtained just under 14 per cent of the votes in the general election of November 1974.   
5 As Susannah Verney appositely notes (1994, 296) ‘[t]he attempt to attract support across a broad section 
of the political spectrum was indicated by PASOK’s attempt to trace its origins to the triple roots of EAM 
(the wartime National Resistance Front), the 1960s Anendotos, and the 1973 Polytechnic uprising against 
the Junta […].  It thus sought recognition as the heir of all the historic anti-Right struggles, laying claim 
simultaneously to the traditions of the Left, the Centre, and the anti-dictatorship student movement.’   
6 Papandreou was conscious of this diversity and has been (rightly) credited with turning it into one of 
the strengths of the political movement which he led (Pangalos 2004, 26).   
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7 Greece belongs to the Greeks.   
8 Greece belongs in the West.   
9 As Verney rightly argues (1994, 304) ‘claiming to be socialist in a country where the Left had always 
been communist-dominated distinguished the party from the communist movement with its “sinful” Civil 
War past and allowed PASOK to present itself as something new.’   
10 For example, a ‘certificate of national probity’ was a formal requirement for the provision of a 
driver’s licence.  Also, in 1962 there were 1,350 political prisoners (Tsoukalas 1969, 145-6).   
11 Accession was mentioned in the Association agreement of 1961 as a formal and mutually agreed 
objective.   
12 Political considerations initially covered both domestic and international issues but in the run-up to 
its accession to power in 1981, the former had become the main focus of PASOK’s rhetoric (see 
infra).   
13 The Simitis era is the only notable exception in the sense that under his leadership references to 
political integration were at least as prominent.   
14 This is what it was at the point of its establishment (Spourdalakis 1998, 23).   
15 This is so ‘because they understood its aim was to make Greece’s post-war orientation to the West 
irreversible’ (Verney 1987, 257).   
16 It is important to distinguish between the public statements that Papandreou made in his capacity as a 
(rather mainstream) academic economist (especially in the 1960s) and the statements that he made as 
a political leader.   
17 In his public statements Papandreou rejected both Western capitalism and the Soviet model.  This 
was part of a strategy that was meant to expand the party’s appeal.  Indeed, Papandreou’s virulent 
criticism of the West combined references to the inherent monopolistic tendencies of capitalism on 
the one hand, with the rejection of European social democracy that he portrayed as the genteel mask 
of capitalism, on the other.  He also rejected the bureaucratic socialism of the Soviet model (Verney 
1994, 304-5).  Both were designed to make PASOK more attractive to segments of the non-
communist Left and the centre.   
18 Karamanlis’ correct tactical decision mirrored the primacy of the political benefits of membership as 
well as the weaknesses of the Greek economy.   
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19 This was already present in PASOK’s rhetoric but it gained greater prominence after the 1977 
general election.   
20 No to monopolies’ Europe; yes to peoples’ Europe.   
21 One good example is provided by the government’s decision to present the new agreement with the 
US as a result of which the most important US military bases remained on Greek soil although, while 
in opposition, PASOK had pledged to do the opposite.   
22 This was an important decision because Simitis was expected to boost the pro-EC camp within the 
Cabinet whilst he was dealing with the crucial issue of maximising the benefits of Greek agriculture 
from the CAP.  CAP funds were a major factor in the reduction of the intensity of the conflict with 
PASOK’s left wing (interview with former senior Cabinet member).   
23 He was President of the Republic since 1980.   
24 The first Greek Presidency (July-December 1983) did not end with the traditional joint 
statement/presidency conclusions.  This has been ascribed to the unwillingness of the French 
government to accept a compromise and was in line with Papandreou’s opinion that the conclusions 
of the presidency ought to be drafted in a way that would enable European citizens to understand and 
accept them (Varfis n.d.).  It should be noted that during that presidency Theodoros Pangalos, then a 
junior trade minister, had successfully promoted the establishment of a new formation of the Council 
of Ministers dealing with consumer protection issues (Pangalos 2003).   
25 The Commission explicitly argued that IMPs were a response to many of the demands outlined in the 
(Greek) memorandum.   
26 Taking advantage of the latter required the active engagement with EC processes instead of the 
frequent denouncement of other governments’ (often assumed) intentions.   
27 While Simitis and Pangalos were major pro-European figures, the Cabinet also included ministers 
who harboured either caution or downright hostility vis-à-vis European integration.   
28 Papandreou did not hesitate to side with the conservative Prime Ministers of Britain and Denmark at 
the European Council meeting of Milan in 1985 in an effort to block this decision.  The Italian 
presidency’s ingenious procedural decision to rely on qualified majority voting enabled the 
circumvention of their opposition but confirmed both Papandreou’s willingness to take on the 
majority as well as his fears regarding the impact of membership of the EC on national sovereignty.  
Nevertheless, it also served the purpose of reminding other member states (and the Commission) that 
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Greek interests could not be ignored within the context of the IGC whose successful conclusion 
required a unanimous decision.   
29 See, for example the statement made in Parliament by Mihelogianis, a socialist MP (Hellenic 
Parliament debates, 14 January 1987, 2614).   
30 This change has been ascribed to the influence exerted by Jacques Delors and Mitterrand’s economic 
policy U-turn of 1983 (interviews with PASOK MEP, Athens, 27 March 2006 and former senior 
Cabinet member, Athens, 11 July 2006).   
31 The Greek government submitted this request in October 1985 i.e. during the IGC.  The Greek 
government had one additional source of lending, namely the IMF.  Given its vehement criticism 
regarding the role of this institution, the Greek government was keen to avoid this option (Kazakos 
1987, 439).   
32 The current account problems faced by the Greek government in 1985 had turned the loan into a 
necessity.  The programme entailed currency devaluation, a tight incomes policy and an attempt to 
bring the ballooning public deficit under control (Tsakalotos 2001, 144).  It had received the explicit 
and concrete backing of Jacques Delors, then President of the European Commission.   
33 Though Papandreou, speaking to one of his close collaborators, angrily cited the need to convince the 
party (a near impossibility at the time) about Simitis’ proposal, it is more likely that he merely used it 
as an excuse to justify the decision to execute this U-turn; after all, he was the party’s undisputed 
leader (interview with former PASOK MEP, Athens, 11 July 2006).   
34 Despite the government’s decision to embark on a spending spree that the country could not afford, 
PASOK lost the 1989 election.   
35 These included Simitis, Pangalos, V. Papandreou, George A. Papandreou and Y. Papantoniou.   
36 As Prime Minister during the second half of the 1980s Papandreou was reluctant to pursue the idea 
of membership of the WEU although the organisation’s then Secretary-General was very positive 
about this prospect.  As a result, Greece ended up joining the WEU a few years later (under the 
conservative ND government) but in a manner that effectively diluted the concrete benefits that were 
expected.  Indeed, on the occasion of the accession of Greece, other member states declared that in 
case of a conflict between a member (such as Greece) and an associated member (such as Turkey), 
the clause of mutual assistance would not apply.   
37 It won 46.9 per cent of the votes and 170 out of a total of 300 seats in Parliament.   
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38 G. Yennimatas and, after his death, Y. Papantoniou were Ministers of National Economy, A. 
Papadopoulos was Minister of Finance.   
39 Simitis was Minister of Trade and Industry and Pangalos Alternate Foreign Minister in charge of 
European affairs.   
40 Unlike similar efforts made by the conservative governments of 1990-3, this stabilisation programme 
(and the one followed by the Simitis government in the second half of the 1990s) does not seem to 
have had a negative impact on the real economy leading, instead, to 2.4 per cent growth rate in 1995.  
This contrasts markedly with the –1.6 per cent growth rate of 1993 (Tsakalotos 2001, table 1, 146).  
In addition, although this programme differs markedly from the economic policies that PASOK 
implemented in the 1980s, PASOK’s efforts in the 1990s entailed an ‘attempt to share the burden of 
adjustment more fairly and to shelter, to some extent, the most vulnerable sections of society’ 
(Tsakalotos 2001, 158).   
41 An intermezzo is, according to the New Oxford Dictionary, ‘a short peace for a solo instrument’.   
42 Simitis was a long-standing vocal supporter of the acceleration of the country’s constructive 
engagement in the process of integration.   
43 The process of the gradual transfer of legislative power from the Council to the EP ought to start 
from the areas that directly affect individual citizens such as the consumer protection, health, human 
rights and the protection of the environment (Simitis 1995, 131).   
44 The looser models entail fewer rules.  This gives greater freedom to egocentric larger states and 
threatens the coherence of the union.  Moreover, differentiated integration should not institutionalise 
divergence; rather it should be designed to help weaker participants catch up (Simitis 1995, 130).   
45 As Kevin Featherstone rightly argues (2003, 931), ‘[t]he shift to ‘sound money and sound public 
finances’ in Greece was clearly inspired by the EU and the discipline of the single currency.  A 
different policy paradigm was imported: one that owed more to the German monetary policy tradition 
than to the traditional Greek electoral cycle’.   
46 Speaking in Parliament in 1999, Simitis rightly claimed that the effort to reduce public debt was 
totally in line with PASOK’s long-standing objective of national emancipation since the more you 
owe to third parties, the more you depend on them (Simitis 2002, 152).   
47 This major reform entailed the merger of a large number of local authorities into a small number of 
viable bodies.   
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48 This concerned transport and energy infrastructure (including new motorways, the modernisation of 
national railways, the new airport and underground of Athens, a large number of new ports and 
marinas) as well as infrastructure that affects the quality of life such as new hospitals, the 
modernisation of the water infrastructure in major urban centres and the biological treatment of 
sewage (Simitis 2005, 252-3).   
49 This policy involved, inter alia, increased social security benefits (especially for low income 
pensioners), increased unemployment benefits and the expansion of free health care to cover all 
registered unemployed people (Simitis 2005, 265). 
50 For many years Greek defence spending was one of the largest (in terms of GDP share) amongst 
members of NATO.   
51 This policy had often allowed other national governments to hide behind what was often perceived as 
Greek intransigence.  This was no longer a viable strategy.  The new Greek policy on the matter 
forced them (and EU institutions) to deal with the realities of Turkey’s bid.   
52 Simitis maintains that ownership is nowadays not as important as the actual operation of public firms 
and objects to the primacy of ownership (over their effectiveness) of the means of production 
(specifically the presence of public firms) as the key criterion for the definition of a progressive 
economic policy (Simitis 2005, 554-8).   
53 Speaking in Parliament in March 1996 Simitis pointed out that one member state (Britain) had 
prevented the adoption by the EU of a statement in support of the Greek view on the Imia incident 
(Simitis 2002a, 63).   
54 The exact opposite pattern marked Papandreou’s tenure.   
55 PASOK obtained 41.49 per cent of the votes in 1996 and 43.79 per cent four years later.   
56 According to the New Oxford Dictionary the term ‘exodus’ is mentioned in the second book of the 
Bible ‘which recounts the departure of the Israelites from slavery in Egypt, their journey across the 
Red Sea and through the wilderness led by Moses, and the giving of the Ten Commandments’.   
57 This happened thirty years after his late father played a major role in the establishment of the party.   
58 The terminology used in Greece on that occasion (‘the handing-over of the ring’) clearly reflects the 
imagery of aristocratic circles.  However, the remainder of the process was effectively designed in an 
explicit effort to disconfirm this notion.  Simitis’ decision to name his successor took many by 
surprise not because he sought to dissociate himself from what seemed to be an almost certain 
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electoral defeat but because of his consistent fight against his own predecessor’s authoritarian 
practices.   
59 Simitis justified his choice (2005, 589-95) by referring to George A. Papandreou’s popularity within 
and beyond the party, his work while he was Minister of Foreign Affairs and the likelihood of a new 
political and electoral dynamic that this decision was likely to generate.   
60 The party’s charter stipulates that the party’s friends have the right to vote and can contribute to party 
policy making but they cannot run for party office (art. 20).   
61 The family name carried significant weight especially with large segments of older generations of 
PASOK voters and sympathisers.   
62 This is roughly one tenth of the country’s entire population.   
63 PASOK’s share of the vote dropped to 40.5 per cent, but the party lost just over 5,000 votes 
compared to the general election of 2000.   
64 This was a major defeat.  PASOK won 34.01 per cent of the vote, i.e. nine percentage points less 
than the conservative ND (43.03 per cent).  The corresponding difference in the European elections of 
1999 was just 3.1 per cent.   
65 This was in line with the views expressed by virtually all Greek political parties on the matter.   
66 Forty per cent is the target.   
67 This was to be achieved through internal consultation and accountability, referenda, an ombudsman, 
etc.   
68 PASOK and the ruling conservative ND supported the ratification (268 votes in favour) whilst 17 
left-wing MPs voted against (Hellenic Parliament debates, 19 April 2005, 7712). 
69 This was in line with the decision of the party conference of March 2005.   
70 The proposal was supported by 123 PASOK and left-wing MPs but it was successfully opposed by 
151 conservative MPs (Hellenic Parliament debates, 12 May 2005, 8455).  Various opinion polls 
published a month later recorded, inter alia, (i) the public’s support for a referendum (80-83 per cent) 
and (ii) the fact that - although the public felt that they knew little about the content of the 
Constitutional Treaty (73 per cent), the debate in parliament and its outcome (65 per cent) – there was 
a majority against ratification (40-46 per cent against, 30-32 per cent in favour) which, the public felt, 
had not been affected by the result of the French referendum.  The surveys also revealed another 
important finding: amongst PASOK voters a majority (38-52 per cent compared to 28-29 per cent) 
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was prepared to vote against the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty while 20-32 per cent refused 
to express an opinion.  ND voters supported it (38-40 per cent in favour, 32-36 per cent against) 
whilst Communist Party voters opposed it - 5-12 per cent in favour, 13-27 per cent against (Ta Nea, 1 
and 2 June 2005, Avgi 1 June 2005; Eleftherotypia 2 and 5 June 2005).   
71 On these notions see Vertovec and Cohen (2003) and Archibugi (2004). 
72 This is a good example since Papandreou appears to equate the EU to classic international 
organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank (Papandreou 2006d, 3).   
73  The same logic underpins his recently (February 2009) announced five national objectives, the first 
of which refers, inter alia, to the country’s ‘equal participation in Europe and international affairs’.  
74 For instance, he has argued that  ‘[n]ow we must reinvent Europe as peace in a globalising world, as 
a socialist project of humanising globalisation’ (Papandreou 2008a) while in a speech in New York 
(2008b) he gave a different meaning to the EU: ‘Now, no one can do this alone, not the US, not 
China, not the European Union, not others. But the US will have to play a leading role, for three 
reasons. First of all, it has its huge responsibility in creating, if not fully creating itself, but very much 
responsible for a large part of the mess, the crisis we now see. Secondly, not even the US can escape 
interdependency.’ 
75 This echoes the switch of the French Parti Socialiste from references to the ‘socialist’ to ‘social 
Europe’ (Marlière, this volume, ΧΧΧ).   
76 This is expressed through an eagerness (also encountered in New Labour) to refuse to give to the EU 
(or at least the prospect of joint action at that level) the prominence that he ascribes to other actors – 
such as the US – when it comes to dealing with major international issues – including the financial 
and economic crisis – despite the fact that the EU is the largest single market on the planet and a 
major trading bloc.  In other words, unlike his predecessor who saw the EU as the ‘natural’ context 
within which Greece should define and pursue its objectives (whilst contributing to the process of 
integration), George A. Papandreou relies on a much more diffuse conception that inevitably 
privileges the status quo and the hegemonic position of the US therein.   
77 There is broad consensus within the Greek political class in support of enlargement (to Turkey and 
Western Balkans).  The government’s policy on Turkey’s accession bid subsequently became an 
additional point of divergence between George A. Papandreou and Costas Simitis (Simitis 2008). 
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78 In his attempt to find a ‘third way’ between the Franco-German and the Anglo-Saxon models, 
Papandreou supported novel but incoherent proposals such as the enhancement of the EU’s 
legitimacy through the use of EU-wide referenda and the direct election of the ‘President of the 
European Union’ (Papandreou 2006f, 2).   
79 Mimis Androulakis’ 70+1 ‘theses’ that were subseqeuntly endorsed by the party at its 8th conference 
in May 2008 have – just like the conference itself – been completely forgotten (Hassapopoulos 2008).  
80 Deepening is also mentioned though only in policy terms.   
81 One good example is the débâcle regarding the compatibility of domestic legislation (including the 
Constitution) that regulates the links between public procurement on the one hand and mass media 
ownership on the other, with EU law (Dimitrakopoulos 2008b, chap. 5). George A. Papandreou’s 
PASOK was remarkably quick to retreat from the defence of the idea that membership of the EU 
entails both rights and duties (and thus do away with the image of the EU as a mere ‘cash cow’).  
Papandreou had a major opportunity to buck the trend and show that active engagement in the EU is 
the only meaningful way to define and promote the ‘national interest’ and that a provincial attitude 
was both counter-productive (in the long term) and ineffective (in the short term), but he avoided it, 
sensing the trend of Euroscepticism that permeates Greek public opinion, as indicated by the opinion 
polls mentioned earlier (see supra).  This is unsurprising since, as a PASOK cadre put it, ‘Europe 
does not sell nowadays’ and senior PASOK politicians who can talk about it, refrain from doing so 
(interview). 
82 The choices he made when he defined the party’s list for the European elections of June 2004 bear 
testimony to this intention. 
83 The same applies to PASOK’s MEPs, whose selection was George A. Papandreou’s first major 
personnel decision (interview with PASOK cadre, Athens, 12 January 2007).   
84 The expulsion of Y. Papantoniou (a senior member of Simitis-led Cabinets) from the parliamentary 
party is a good example of this leadership style.  Papantoniou went against George A. Papandreou’s 
declared populist line on the issue of the privatisation by the conservative government of a major 
state-owned bank by declaring (rightly) that this was also the policy of the previous PASOK 
government.   
85 As T. Pappas (2008) appositely put it, ‘Europe is the fateful word that for three decades casts its 
shadow on Simitis’ relations with the Papandreous’. 
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86 This might seem to be a rather harsh criticism but it is not.  Indeed, Papandreou did find the time to 
make a public statement regarding the suicide attack against Benazir Bhutto in October 2007 but said 
nothing about the Treaty of Lisbon that was agreed on just a few days earlier.   
87 For example in his speech in Parliament he focused on the government’s ‘absence’ from negotiations 
in Brussels and the request for a referendum (Hellenic Parliament debate, 11 June 2008, 1086-90). 
88 It won 38.1 per cent of the votes and 102 out of a total of 300 seats in Parliament.  In comparison to 
the previous general election, PASOK lost 276,678 votes and 15 seats.   
89 Approximately 738,078 members and ‘friends’ of PASOK voted, including 16-18 year olds, 
immigrants and nationals of other EU member states.  George A. Papandreou won 55.9 per cent of 
the votes, Ev. Venizelos 38.1 and Costas Skandalidis 5.7 per cent. 
90 It is worth noting a text authored by Simitis’ close collabotators (ISTAME 2006) which inevitably 
reflects the ideas and objectives of the Simitis era.  An updated version of the same text was 
subsequently presented as the think tank’s ‘study’ on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the 
Treaty of Rome (ISTAME 2007).  This was a desperate effort on the part of the think tank’s 
leadership to conceal the total absence within the party of any effort to problematise the issue of 
European integration. 
91 This text arguably reflects the views of George A. Papandreou’s closest collaboratos (be they elected 
or not, within the party or elsewhere) whose role in the making of European policy seems to be 
significant but has not been systematically researched (interview with PASOK cadre). 
92 Despite the intensive debate within academia and amongst politicians on this notion, the authors of 
this text do not indicate what they mean.  Politicisation is the development of public political 
contestation both (i) on the definition of the EU’s agenda and the policies that exemplify it and (ii) 
the operation of the EU’s institutions that involves (but isnot limited to) the distinction between Left 
and Right (Hix 2008). 
93 See ISTAME (2009, 14) for proposals that he had mentioned in the past and subsequently chose to 
re-use arguing that they are a response to ‘stich-ups be they for Barroso or anybody else’ (Papandreou 
2009b). 
94 See ISTAME (2009, 14). These proposals are probably destined for the domestic audience since they 
were not included in the same think tank’s contribution to the debate between similar organisations 
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attached to sister European parties during the preparation of the 2009 European election manifesto of 
the Party of European Socialists (ENSoF 2008, 15-17). 
95 On the debate as to whether (a) the EU should (or not) be confied to the role of a ‘soft power’ and (b) 
this option is ‘progressive’ see Hettne and Soderbaum where ‘soft imperialism’ is construed as the 
use of soft (non-military) power ‘in a hard way, that is an asymmetric form of dialogue or even the 
imposition or strategic use of norms and conditionalities enforced for reasons of self-interest rather 
than for the creation of a genuine (interregional) dialogue’ (2005, 539). 
96 Twenty-two MEPs are elected in Greece.  PASOK won 36.7 per cent of the votes (and eight seats), 
the conservative ND 32.3 per cent (eight seats), the Communist Party 8.4 per cent while three smaller 
parties (including the extreme right-wing LAOS and, for the first time in European elections, the 
Greens) also won seats.  The turn-out rate was 52.63 per cent.  
97 PASOK won (43.92 per cent) comfortably (more than ten percentage points of difference vis-a-vis 
conservative ND that came second).  Thus PASOK has a confortable majority in Parliament (160 of 
the 300 seats). 
98 Even when debates do take place they are very rarely, if at all, couched in written contributions.  This 
is what A. G. Passas (2008) calls ‘the culture of spoken word’. One of the main problems we 
encountered during our research for this chapter was the very limited number of written party 
documents.  As a result, we had to rely on politicians’ speeches, books and several interviews (as well 
as written testimonies) provided by our interlocutors.  
99 At least in Andreas Papandreou’s mind (cf. PASOK 1976, 16 where – even with C. Simits’ seal of 
approval -  the party explicitly rejects the options of membership, ‘as well as membership under 
certain conditions’). 
100 Indeed, this applies not only to the party’s European policy but also its switch to a new policy 
paradigm.   
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APPENDIX: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
Gerassimos Arsenis, former PASOK MP and Cabinet minister, Athens, 11 July 2006. 
Paraskevas Avgerinos, former PASOK MEP and Cabinet minister, Athens, 13 July 
2006. 
Panos Beglitis, PASOK MEP, Athens, 27 March 2006. 
Anna Diamantopoulou, PASOK MP, former European Commissioner and junior 
minister, Athens, 10 July 2006. 
Pantelis Economou, former PASOK MP, Athens, 30 March 2006. 
Yiorgos Floridis, PASOK MP and former Cabinet minister, Athens, 12 July 2006. 
Yannis Kapsis, former PASOK MP and alternate Minister of Foreign Affairs, Athens, 
28 March 2006. 
Yiorgos Katiforis, former PASOK MEP, former member of the Praesidium of the 
Convention on the Future of Europe and former economic adviser to Prime 
Minister Andreas G. Papandreou, Athens, 11 July 2006. 
Paulina Lampsa, PASOK cadre (International affairs secretariat), Athens, 12 January 
2007. 
Apostolos Lazaris, former PASOK Cabinet minister, Athens, 30 March 2006. 
Andreas Loverdos, PASOK MP and former junior minister, Athens, 13 July 2006. 
Vangelis Papachristos, PASOK MP, Athens, 30 March 2006. 
Alexandros Papadopoulos, PASOK MP and former Cabinet minister, Athens, 12 July 
2006. 
Yannos Papantoniou, PASOK MP, former MEP and Cabinet minister, Athens, 13 
July 2006. 
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Christos Papoutsis, PASOK MP, former European Commissioner and Cabinet 
minister, Athens, 27 March 2006. 
Yiorgos Romeos, former PASOK MP, MEP and Cabinet minister, Athens, 28 March 
2006. 
Yannis Roubatis, PASOK cadre and former MEP, Athens, 30 March 2006. 
Panagiotis Roumeliotis, former PASOK MEP and Cabinet minister, Athens, 10 July 
2006. 
Dimitris Stefanou, PASOK cadre and adviser to George A. Papandreou, Athens, XX 
March 2006.  
Nikos Themelis, former aide to Prime Minister Costas Simitis, Athens, 14 April 2006. 
Grigoris Varfis, former European Commissioner and PASOK junior Foreign Affairs 
Minister (European affairs), Aegina, 31 March 2006. 
Evangelos Venizelos, PASOK MP and former Cabinet minister, Athens, 11 January 
2007. 
 
 
